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Mediation has become very common in the USA 
and Australia—at least partly because of court-mandated 
mediation initiatives.1  Lawyers often represent clients at 
mediations, so the increased use of mediation makes it 
important to understand how both jurisdictions regulate 
lawyers’ advocacy on behalf of their clients during 
mediation.  
This article comparatively analyzes how 
professional standards regulate the truthfulness of lawyers’ 
advocacy during mediation in Australia and the United 
States.  It focuses on uniform regulation in those 
jurisdictions.  
Part One will comparatively analyze the relevant 
regulations in Australia and the United States, and the types 
of obligations contained in those regulations—for example, 
obligations of truthfulness and good faith.  Part Two will 
examine the impact of these standards in shaping lawyers’ 
conduct during mediation in Australia and the United States 
and suggest some measures that might be taken by regulators 
to more effectively control lawyers’ advocacy in mediation. 
It is beyond the scope of this article to examine how 
truthfulness of advocacy in mediation is affected by the 
threat of common law actions (such as negligent 
misstatement or misrepresentation).  Such common law 
actions differ across the fifty states of the United States and 
 
1 See The Honourable Thomas Bathurst AC, Chief Justice of New South Wales, 
Off with the Wig: Issues that Arise for Advocates When Switching from the 
Courtroom to the Negotiating Table, Speech at the Australian Disputes Centre 
1-2 (March 30, 2017) 
(http://www.supremecourt.justice.nsw.gov.au/Documents/Publications/Speech
es/2017%20Speeches/Bathurst%20CJ/Bathurst_20170330.pdf); Dorcas Quek, 
Mandatory Mediation: An Oxymoron? Examining the Feasibility of 
Implementing a Court-mandated Mediation Program, 11 CARDOZO J. OF 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 479, 479–80 (2010). 
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the seven Australian states.  They are too unwieldy to even 
summarize in this article. 
It is also beyond the scope of this article to examine 
how remedies under consumer protection statutes regulate 
truthfulness in mediation advocacy (such as the Australian 
Consumer Law in the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 
(Cth) (“ACL”), and the United States Federal Trade 
Commission Act of 1914 (“FTC Act”)).2  However, given 
that there are only two primary statutes across both 
jurisdictions, their impact on lawyers’ conduct will be 
briefly noted.  In Australia, section 18 of the ACL prohibits 
conduct in trade or commerce that is misleading or 
deceptive, or likely to mislead or deceive.3  It was initially 
introduced as section 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 
(Cth).  In its present form, section 18 applies to lawyers 
representing clients at mediations,4 and it cannot be excluded 
by a contract or agreement.5  It has generated thousands of 
relevant decisions which have led to a general upgrading of 
corporate and legal mores surrounding mediation and 
negotiation in Australia.6  
In the United States, section 5(1) of the FTC Act 
prohibits unfair and deceptive acts and practices in or 
affecting commerce.7  As the provision requires proof of 
 
2 Australian Consumer Law 2010 (Cth) s 4(1) (Austrl.); 63 Cong. Ch. 311 
(1917). 
3 Note that section 4(1) of the ACL also prohibits representations made by 
lawyers about future matters which are not based on reasonable grounds (e.g. 
where a lawyer says “my client won’t be making any further settlement offers” 
without firm instructions to that effect from the client). Australian Consumer 
Law 2010 (Cth) s 4(1) (Austrl.). 
4 See Australian Consumer Law 2010 (Cth) s 2 (Austrl.) (defining “trade and 
commerce” and “services”). 
5 See Australian Consumer Law 2010 (Cth) s 96 (Austrl.) (providing that it “has 
effect despite any stipulation in any contract or agreement to the contrary”).  
6 This is exemplified by the expansion of Australia’s leading annotated version 
of the ACL, Miller’s Australian Competition and Consumer Law Annotated, 
from 246 pages in 1979 (1st edition) to approximately 2,406 pages in 2020 (42d 
edition). 
7 15 U.S.C.A. § 45. 
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unfairness in addition to deception (because of the word 
“and”) and does not prohibit conduct which is “likely to” 
have the prohibited effect, it less stringently regulates 
lawyers’ truthfulness than the ACL.8  For example, a 
lawyers’ statement that is “likely to deceive” would not be 
prohibited under the FTC Act but would be prohibited by the 
ACL.  
Neither the FTC Act nor ACL impose penalties for 
breach like the relevant ethical rules.  However, they may 
expose lawyers and their clients in mediation to a suite of 
possible remedies such as damages and the revocation of any 
agreement induced by unlawful conduct.  
 
1)  RELEVANT STANDARDS OF 
CONDUCT 
This part analyzes the primary regulation of the 
truthfulness of lawyers’ advocacy during mediation in each 
jurisdiction.  In the United States, this regulation is the 
American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct (“Model Rules”).  In Australia, it is the Legal 
Profession Uniform Conduct (Solicitors) Rules 2015 
(“Solicitors Rules”) and Legal Profession Uniform Conduct 
(Barristers) Rules 2015 (“Barristers Rules”).9  Given the 
length of this article, there will be little attention given to 
specific statutes in Australia and the United States (such as 
the ACL and FTC – as above), rules of civil procedure, and 
court rules regulating conduct during mediation. However, 
they are noted for completeness. 
 
8 See generally 15 U.S.C.A. § 45. 
9 See generally Legal Profession Uniform Law Australian Solicitors’ Conduct 
Rules 2015 (Cth), 
https://www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/html/inforce/current/sl-2015-
0244#statusinformation [hereinafter Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 
2015]; Legal Profession Uniform Conduct (Barristers) Rules 2015 (Cth), 
https://www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/html/inforce/current/sl-2015-0243 
[hereinafter Australian Barristers’ Conduct Rules 2015].   
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By way of background, the Model Rules were 
adopted by the American Bar Association’s House of 
Delegates in 1983 and have been adopted by all states except 
California.10  Adoption by a state renders them binding on 
lawyers in that state.  Some states have slightly amended the 
Model Rules in adopting them.  It is beyond the scope of this 
article to assess each state’s version of the Model Rules—
particularly because this task has already been completed by 
the ABA which provides comparative tables on its website 
explaining the differences between the Model Rules and the 
equivalent rule in each state.11  In addition to the states, many 
federal district courts have indirectly adopted the Model 
Rules by holding that the state rules are binding in the federal 
district in which they sit, and some federal district courts 
have directly adopted them where state law is silent on 
certain issues.12 
In Australia, the profession consists of both 
solicitors and barristers (the specialist court-room 
advocates).  There are separate but similar rules for barristers 
and solicitors.  For solicitors, a model regime was developed 
by the Law Council of Australia and promulgated in June 
2011.13  Each state except Tasmania and Western Australia 
has adopted the model rules for solicitors, and each state bar 
association has separate rules for their barristers.  As with 
 
10 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/
model_rules_of_professional_conduct/. 
11 See generally Additional Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility 
Resources, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/lin
ks_of_interest/. 
12 Tonia Lucio, Standards and Regulation of Professional Conduct in Federal 
Practice, THE FEDERAL LAWYER, July 2017, at 50, 51–52. 
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the Model Rules, adoption of the Solicitors Rules and 
Barristers Rules by a state renders them binding. 
Neither the Model Rules, Solicitors Rules, nor the 
Barristers Rules expressly apply to mediation advocacy.14  
Perhaps because advocacy by lawyers at mediations has 
become common only recently, there are also no binding 
additional or supplementary rules of conduct governing 
lawyers acting as legal representatives during mediation in 
Australia or the United States.15  As a result, the ethical 
obligations of mediation advocates are derived solely from 
the generally applicable professional conduct rules (i.e. the 
Model Rules, Solicitors Rules and Barristers Rules). 
In the United States, there has been some attempt at 
expressly regulating conduct during mediations via the 
Uniform Mediation Act.16  However, this does not purport to 
regulate the conduct of parties beyond issues of 
confidentiality and enforcement of mediation agreements,17 
and does not address ethical issues relating to truthfulness.  
In Australia, there are non-binding standards for lawyers in 
mediation released by the Law Society of New South Wales 
and Law Council of Australia,18 which set out expectations 
of lawyers’ conduct during mediation.  While they are non-
binding (so a breach cannot lead to disciplinary action), they 
remain helpful because they are the only mediation-specific 
 
14 Bobette Wolski, The Evaluation of the Current Rules of Professional Conduct 
Governing Legal Representatives in Mediation in Australia and the Unites 
States and a Range of Proposed Alternative 'Non-Adversarial' Ethics Systems 
for Lawyers (August 2011) (Ph.D. thesis, Bond University) (on file with Bond 
University) at 25. 
15 See generally Wolski, supra note 14. 
16 E.g., Uniform Mediation Act., 2004 Bill Text NJ S.B. 679; Uniform 
Mediation Act., 2007 Bill Text NV S.B. 292. 
17 Wolski, supra note 14, at 26. 
18 LAW SOCIETY OF NEW SOUTH WALES, Professional Standards for Legal 
Practitioners in Mediation (contained in the Law Society of New South Wales 
Dispute Resolution Kit) (December 2012); LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA, 
supra note 13. 
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standards in Australia.  They aspire to influence 
practitioners’ conduct by identifying best practices in 
situations of uncertainty and provide guidelines for 
professional bodies and courts to consider during 
disciplinary proceedings.19 
The analysis below will focus on the principal 
obligations imposed by the Model Rules, Solicitors Rules, 
and Barristers Rules.  It will begin with a grand summary of 
lawyers’ ethical obligations under the rules and significant 
statutes in Australia and the United States. 
There may be other rules or sections in these statutes 
and ethical rules which also relate to truthfulness in 
mediation but assessing each such obligation is not possible 
in an article of this length.   
 
19 Bobette Wolski, On Mediation, Legal Representatives and Advocates, 38(1) 
UNI. OF NEW SOUTH WALES L. J. 5, 12 (2015) [hereinafter Wolski, On 
Mediation]. 
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1a) Grand Summaries of Lawyers’ Obligations 
 
AUSTRALIA 
To whom  
is the obligation 
owed? 
 
            
 
 
  What is the nature of the obligation? 
       
 
 
What is the relevant rule or law? 
Mediator  
1. Paramount duty to the mediator and 
administration of justice 
2. Not deceive, or knowingly or recklessly 
mislead, the mediator  
3. Take all necessary steps to correct a 
misleading statement 
4. Not engage in conduct which is prejudicial to 
the administration of justice or profession 
 
1. Solicitors Rule (SR) 3.1; 
Barristers Rules (BR) 4 and 
24  
2. SR 19.1; BR 24 
3. SR 19.2; BR 25  
4. SR 5.1; BRs 4 and 23  
Opposing lawyer   
5. [Solicitors only] Not knowingly make a false 
statement in relation to the case 
6. [Barristers only] Not knowingly make a false 
or misleading statement in relation to the case 
7. Take all necessary steps to correct any 
misleading statement made  
o [Barristers] No need to correct an 
opponent’s error 
o [Solicitors] No need to correct an 
opponent’s or other person’s error 
 
5. SR 22.1  
6. BR 49  
7. SRs 19.3, 22.2 and 22.3; BRs 





8. Participate in mediation in good faith 
 
8. Federal and state statutes such 
as § 27 of NSW Civil 
Procedure Act, and Court 
Rules 
Any person    
9. [Solicitors] Not make any statement which 
grossly exceeds the legitimate assertion of 
their client’s rights or entitlements AND also 
misleads or intimidates the other person 
10. [Solicitors] Not use tactics that go beyond 
legitimate advocacy and are primarily 
designed to embarrass or frustrate another  
11. [Solicitors] Be honest and courteous in all 
dealings  
 
9. SR 34.1.1 (also note § 18 of 
ACL)  
10. SR 34.1.3  
11. SR 4.1.2  
12. BR 4(c)  
13. BR 8(a) 
14. § 18 of ACL  
15. § 4(1) of ACL 
9
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12. [Barristers] Act honestly and fairly 
13. [Barristers] Not engage in conduct which is 
dishonest or otherwise discreditable  
14. Not engage in conduct that is misleading or 
deceptive, or likely to mislead or deceive 
15. Not make a representation about a future 
matter that is not based on reasonable grounds 
Client  
16. Act in client’s best interests (note the potential 
of this obligation to conflict with the above) 
 
16. SR 4.1; BR 35  
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
To whom is the 
obligation owed? 
 
              
       What is the nature of the obligation? 
    





1. Not make a false statement of material fact or 
law 
2. Not fail to disclose a material fact when 
disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a 
criminal or fraudulent act by a client (unless 
prohibited by MR 1.6) 
3. Engage in an act or practice that is unfair and 
deceptive   
 
1. Model Rule (MR) 4.1 
2. MR 4.1 
3. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a)(1) 
(West 2006) 
Mediator  
4. Not engage in conduct which is prejudicial to 
the administration of justice 
5. Demonstrate respect for the legal system 
6. Seek improvement of the law, administration 
of justice and the quality of service rendered 
by the profession  
7. Improve the law and the legal profession  
8. Exemplify the profession's ideals of public 
service  
 
4. MR 8.4 
5. MR Preamble [5]  
6. MR Preamble [6]  
7. MR Preamble [7]  





9. Participate in mediation in good faith 
 
9. Federal and state statutes, 
such as Fed. R. Civ. P. 16, 
and Court Rules 
Client  
10. Act in client’s best interests–such as by 
providing competent representation and using 
reasonable diligence and promptness (note the 
potential to conflict with the above) 
 
10. MRs 1.1 to 1.4 
10
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1b) Obligations relating to truthfulness 
 
i. Australia 
Before examining the six types of Australian duties 
relevant to truthfulness below, it is important to note that the 
Australian Rules draw a distinction between duties owed to 
the mediator and duties owed to opponents and others.  In 
other words, the duties depend on whom the lawyer is 
addressing.  This distinction will be evident in the analysis 
of the rules below.  Also, while it has been suggested by the 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales that 
there is a single “duty of honesty owed to opponents,”20 as 
the analysis below will show, it is more appropriate to state 
that, in the context of a mediation, lawyers may owe 
multiple obligations to their opponents which relate to 
truthfulness.  
First, the paramount and highest duty is owed to the 
“court.”  The court is defined in both the Solicitors and 
Barristers Rules to include a mediation.21  The relevant 
duties are therefore owed to the mediator as they would be 
owed to the court in litigation.22  Rule 19.1 of the Solicitors 
Rules states that “[a] solicitor must not deceive or knowingly 
or recklessly mislead the court.”23  The principal 
obligation—not to deceive the mediator—is unqualified.  
Rule 19.2 adds to this by stating that a “solicitor must take 
 
20 Bathurst, supra note 1, at ¶ 21. 
21 Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, Glossary of Terms (Austl.); 
Australian Barristers’ Conduct Rules 2015 (Cth) r. 125 (Austl.). 
22 See generally Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015; Australian 
Barristers’ Conduct Rules 2015. The duty is owed to the mediator because a 
lawyer cannot owe a duty to an abstract noun or a process and already owes 
different duties to their opposing lawyer and opposing client.  So, the only entity 
to whom the lawyer could owe the relevant duty is the mediator. See Wolski, 
supra note 14, at 31–32. 
23 Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 19.1 (Austl.) 
11
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all necessary steps to correct a misleading statement.”24  
There are equivalent obligations to the mediator in Rules 24 
and 25 of the Barristers Rules.25 
Because these duties of solicitors and barristers 
apply to any statement made to the mediator, the other 
persons present in mediation (namely, the opposing lawyer 
and opposing client) also presumably receive the benefit of 
the duties while the mediator is in the room.  However, 
perplexingly, this must mean that if the mediator leaves the 
room, those remaining are only protected by the different, 
less stringent rules outlined in this part of the article (i.e. 
duties owed to the opposing lawyer, opposing client and 
third parties).  Such shifting ethical sands make it more 
difficult for lawyers to manage their conduct during 
mediation than when subject to the static ethical rules 
applicable to litigation. 
In the United States, the Model Rules do not contain 
any similar differentiated obligations.  They simply, through 
Model Rule 4.1, impose a duty on a lawyer representing a 
client at a mediation that is applicable to all persons except 
the lawyer’s client.26 
Second, Rule 22.1 of the Solicitors Rules provides 
that “[a] solicitor must not knowingly make a false statement 
to an opponent in relation to the case.”27  Rule 22.2 builds 
on this, obliging solicitors to “take all necessary steps to 
correct any false statement made . . . to an opponent as soon 
as possible” after becoming aware of its falsity.28  Rule 22.3 
further informs the obligations above, by providing that “[a] 
solicitor will not have made a false statement to the 
opponent simply by failing to correct” an opponent’s error.29  
These provisions are mirrored by Rules 49 to 51 of the 
 
24 Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 19.2 (Austl.). 
25 Australian Barristers’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 24–25 (Austl.). 
26 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
27 Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 22.1 (Austl). 
28 Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 22.2 (Austl.).  
29 Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 22.3 (Austl.). 
12
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Barristers Rules–although Rule 49 extends to any false or 
misleading statement, so it is broader than Solicitors Rule 
22.1.30 
It is noted that the Solicitors Rules contain the 
unique Rule 19.3, which states that a solicitor will not 
mislead by simply failing to correct an opponent’s or other 
person’s error.31  This is broader than Rule 22.3 above and 
Barristers Rule 51 because it applies to statements of “other 
persons,” not just an opponent.  
Third, there are more specific obligations dealing 
with truthfulness to the mediator contained in Rules 19.4 to 
19.12 of the Solicitors Rules.32  Similar provisions are 
contained in 26 to 29 of the Barristers Rules; however, they 
do not apply to mediation (they only apply to civil trials).33  
Therefore, it is clear that lawyers have different obligations 
in litigation than in mediation, despite contrary assertions.34  
In any case, such specific obligations relating to truthfulness 
to the mediator are not contained in the US Model Rules (as 
above, because “tribunal” is not defined to include 
mediation).35   
Fourth, Rule 34.1.3 prevents solicitors from using 
tactics that go beyond legitimate advocacy and are primarily 
designed to embarrass or frustrate another person.36  
Although cast in broad terms, this rule establishes some 
restrictions on the tactics solicitors may employ in 
mediation.  There is no equivalent restriction on barristers’ 
tactics in Australia nor on lawyers’ tactics in the United 
States.   
 
30 Australian Barristers’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 49–51 (Austl.). 
31 Australian Barristers’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 19.3 (Austl.). 
32 Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 19.4–19.12 (Austl.). 
33 Australian Barristers’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 26–29 (Austl.). 
34 Bathurst, supra note 1, at 25. 
35 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.0(m) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
36 Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 34.1.3 (Austl.). 
13
Angyal and Saady: Legal Lying?
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2021
[Vol. 21: 355, 2021]                                                               Legal Lying? 
                                             PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
 
 368 
Fifth, Rule 34.1.1 prohibits a solicitor from making 
any statement which grossly exceeds the legitimate assertion 
of their client’s rights or entitlements and which misleads or 
intimidates another person.37  This is relevant to 
overstatement and puffing and is largely directed at how 
statements are phrased—ensuring advocates employ careful 
language when speaking during mediation.  Unlike 
Australian consumer-protection statutes, namely section 18 
of the ACL, breach of Rule 34.1.1 requires the statement to 
actually mislead the other person, rather than merely be 
“likely to” mislead.38  As solicitors are subject to both the 
Solicitors Rules and ACL, this distinction only relates to 
liability—as a breach of the Solicitors Rules may lead to 
professional misconduct findings, while breach of the ACL 
may lead to civil liability.  Nevertheless, it should be 
acknowledged.  Again, there is no equivalent restriction on 
barristers’ tactics, nor on lawyers’ tactics in the United 
States.   
Sixth, there is a broad obligation in Rule 4.1.2 of the 
Solicitors Rules that compels solicitors to be honest and 
courteous in all dealings with their clients, other solicitors 
and third parties.39  Rule 5(c) of the Barristers Rules 
similarly requires barristers to act honestly and fairly.40  
There is a more limited duty in Rule 8(a) of the Barristers 
Rules which prevents barristers from engaging in conduct 
which is dishonest or otherwise discreditable to barristers.41  
These obligations may be argued to require some degree of 
truthfulness during mediation—although they have yet to be 
considered in that context.  This is yet another example of 
the difficulty that arises from the rules not specifically 
dealing with the obligations of mediation advocates.   
 
37 Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 34.1.1 (Austl.). 
38 Australian Consumer Law 2010 (Cth) s 18 (Austrl.); Australian Solicitors’ 
Conduct Rules 2015, r. 34.1.1 (Austl.). 
39 Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 4.1.2 (Austl.). 
40 Australian Barristers’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 5(c) (Austl.). 
41 Australian Barristers’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 8(a) (Austl.). 
14
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ii.    The United States – Model Rule 4.1   
Unlike the Australian rules, the Model Rules do not 
impose separate obligations relating to the court and third 
persons.  Rather, they contain a single obligation which only 
relates to third persons.  A “third person” includes the 
mediator of a dispute in which a lawyer is representing a 
party.42  It also includes the lawyer’s opponent and the 
opponent’s client, but it does not include a lawyer’s own 
client,43 nor does it include a judge.44   
 Model Rule 4.1 provides that: 
In the course of representing a client, a lawyer 
must not knowingly: 
a) Make a false statement of material 
fact or law to a third person; nor 
b) Fail to disclose a material fact to a 
third person when disclosure is 
necessary to avoid assisting a 
criminal or fraudulent act by a 
client, unless disclosure is 
prohibited by Rule 1.6.45   
The single obligation referred to above is contained 
in Model Rule 4.1(a).  The focus of this paper will be on 
4.1(a) because it squarely deals with truthfulness.  While 
4.1(b) also deals with truthfulness, it is only applicable in 
very limited circumstances (i.e. to avoid assisting a client’s 
 
42 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
43 State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Bolusky, 2001 OK 26, ¶ 18 n. 5, 23 P.3d 268, 
275 n. 5 (citing MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT Ch. 1, App. 3-A. (OKLA. BAR 
ASS’N 1991)). 
44 Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Rohrback, 591 A.2d 488, 495–97 n. 
8 (Md. 1991) (citing MARYLAND LAWYERS’ RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 
4.1(a)(2) (MD. STATE BAR ASS’N 1990)) (holding attorney Rohrback’s failure 
to disclose the client’s use of a false name to the Commissioner overseeing the 
criminal case fails to meet the clear and convincing evidence standard 
requirement to find a Rule 4.1 violation). 
45 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
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criminal or fraudulent act and where it is not trumped by 
Rule 1.6).  It is therefore less commonly invoked than 4.1(a) 
and unlikely to arise in the context of mediation.   
 
iii.     The United States – The History of Model 
Rule 4.1(a)   
The predecessor to Model Rule 4.1(a) was 
contained in Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(5) of the ABA’s 
1969 Model Code of Professional Conduct, which provided 
that “[i]n his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not . . 
. knowingly make a false statement of law or fact.”46  
Commenting on this rule, the reporter to the ABA’s 
Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards 
(which drafted the Model Rules) and eminent expert on legal 
ethics,47 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., said:   
This provision might be characterized as 
a minimalist formulation of the law of 
disclosure. It prohibits only 
misrepresentation and requires no 
affirmative disclosure. It is limited to 
statements of “fact” as distinguished 
from evidence, indications, portents, 
opinions, possibilities, or even 
probabilities of which the lawyer may be 
aware. It is limited to matters that are 
false as distinguished from those of 
which the lawyer is skeptical or even 
suspicious.48   
 
46 MODEL CODE OF PRO. RESP. DR 7-102(A)(5) (1969) (AM. BAR ASS’N, 
amended 1980). 
47 Sam Roberts, Geoffrey Hazard, Influential Arbiter of Legal Ethics, Dies at 
88, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/18/obituaries/geoffrey-hazard-influential-
arbiter-of-legal-ethics-dies-at-88.html; A.L.I., In Memoriam, In Memoriam: 
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., (Jan. 11, 2018), 
https://www.ali.org/news/articles/memoriam-geoffrey-c-hazard-jr/. 
48 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Lawyer's Obligation to be Trustworthy When 
Dealing with Opposing Parties, 33 S.C. L. REV. 181, 189 (1981). 
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In 1981, the ABA’s Commission on Evaluation of 
Professional Standards proposed a final draft of its new 
model ethical rules, which contained Model Rule 4.1(a).49  
That rule provided that “[i]n the course of representing a 
client a lawyer shall not: (a) Knowingly make a false 
statement of fact or law to a third person.”50  In Hazard’s 
view, the proposed final draft of Model Rule 4.1(a) 
corresponded to the existing disciplinary rule (i.e. DR 7-
102(A)(5)).51   
But this modest proposal did not survive.  The rule 
that emerged from the ABA’s 1983 Annual Meeting was 
qualified by the term “material” (a term that was defined in 
an early draft of the Model Rules but not in the final 
version).52  The rule provided that “[i]n representing a client 
a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement of 
material fact or law to a third person.”53  In relation to that 
rule, the Commission commented that it was “substantially 
similar” to DR 7-102(A)(5),54 despite the earlier rule being 
 
49 Hazard, supra note 48, at 191. 
50 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.1(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N, Proposed Final 
Draft May 30, 1981), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_res
ponsibility/kutak_5-81.pdf. 
51 Hazard, supra note 48, at 191. 
52 It provided that “‘[m]aterial’ when used in reference to degree or extent 
denotes a matter of practical importance as distinct from one that is formal or 
nominal.”  MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT Terminology (AM. BAR ASS’N, 
Proposed Final Draft May 30, 1981), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_res
ponsibility/kutak_5-81.pdf. 
53 L. STANLEY CHAUVIN, JR., AM. BAR ASS’N HOUSE OF DELEGATES, REPORT 
401 TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES ON PROPOSED MODEL RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, at 111 (July 11, 1983), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_res
ponsibility/kutak_8-83.pdf (emphasis added). 
54 ROBERT J. KUTAK, AM. BAR ASS’N HOUSE OF DELEGATES, REPORT 400 TO 
THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, APPENDIX B, COMPARISON OF PROPOSED MODEL 
RULES, AS REVISED, WITH PROVISIONS OF 1969 MODEL CODE OF 
 
17
Angyal and Saady: Legal Lying?
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2021
[Vol. 21: 355, 2021]                                                               Legal Lying? 
                                             PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
 
 372 
unqualified by the word “material,” and the new rule being 
qualified to an undefined extent, as the word “material” was 
included but not defined.   
 
iv.    The United States – The Effect of Model 
Rule 4.1(a)   
Since its adoption, Model Rule 4.1(a) has created “a 
floor below which lawyer-negotiators may not go.”55  
However, there is a “wide chasm dividing expert opinion on 
the applicable standard of truthfulness” under the Rule.56   
The terms of Model Rule 4.1(a) prohibit a lawyer 
from knowingly making false statements of material fact or 
law.57  “Knowingly” is defined as denoting “actual 
knowledge of the fact in question.”58  A person's knowledge 
“may also be inferred from circumstances.”59  Neither 
“material” nor “false” are defined in the rule.  While the 
meaning of false is quite straightforward, the meaning of 
material is subject to great doubt and will be explored below.   
Essentially, unlike the Australian rules, Model Rule 
4.1(a) permits a U.S. lawyer representing a client at a 
mediation to knowingly make false statements about non-
material facts.  It also permits a U.S. lawyer to knowingly 
make false statements about non-factual matters.   
In other words, its effect is that small lies are legal, 
while large lies are not.  It is not clear whether the basis for 
 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, at 16 (June 30, 1982), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_res
ponsibility/kutak_8-82.pdf (comparing the revised proposed model rules with 
provisions of the model code of professional responsibility from 1969). 
55 Ausherman v. Bank of Am. Corp., 212 F. Supp. 2d 435, 450 (D. Md. 2002); 
Alexsam, Inc. v. WildCard Sys., No. 15-CV61736-BLOOM/VALLE, 2019 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24347, at 26–29 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2019). 
56 John W. Cooley, Mediation Magic: Its Use and Abuse, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 
1, 95 (1997). 
57 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
58 See In re Tocco, 984 P.2d 539, 543 (Ariz. 1999) (quoting Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 
42); Brown v. Cnty. of Genesee, 872 F.2d 169 (6th Cir. 1989). 
59 Tocco, 984 P.2d at 543. 
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this position is that small lies are of no consequence, or 
alternatively, that everyone expects negotiators to lie so the 
ethical regulators’ focus should be on preventing large lies 
that might affect the outcome of the mediation.  But a series 
of small but legal lies could have more impact than one big 
illegal lie.   
Further, whatever the basis of the Model Rule, its 
impact and operation entirely depend on distinguishing 
material facts from nonmaterial ones and factual statements 
from nonfactual ones.  As the below analysis shows, those 
responsible for regulating lawyers’ truthfulness have not 
been successful in drawing these distinctions.  
v. The United States – 
Distinguishing Statements for the 
Purposes of Model Rule 4.1(a) 
i) Comment to Model Rule 4.1
A Comment accompanies Model Rule 4.1.  Like all 
Comments to the Model Rules, it is not binding.  Its presence 
acknowledges that the Rule’s scope is not immediately 
obvious.  Under the heading “Statements of Fact,” the 
Comment relevantly provides that: 
Whether a particular statement should be 
regarded as one of fact can depend on the 
circumstances.  Under generally accepted 
conventions in negotiation, certain types of 
statements ordinarily are not taken as 
statements of material fact.  Estimates of 
price or value placed on the subject of a 
transaction and a party’s intentions as to an 
acceptable settlement of a claim are 
ordinarily in this category, and so is the 
existence of an undisclosed principal 
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except where nondisclosure of the 
principal would constitute fraud.60   
The Comment therefore establishes a circumstance-
dependent test for determining whether a statement is one of 
fact.  Presumably, the relevant “circumstances” mean the 
circumstances in which the statement is made.  
Despite starting off by providing guidance about 
distinguishing between factual and non-factual statements, 
confusingly, the Comment fails to deal with that distinction 
and instead discusses the distinction between material and 
nonmaterial facts.  It does so by stating that the following are 
“ordinarily” not “material fact[s]”: first, estimates of price or 
value placed on the subject of a transaction—which 
seemingly permits lies about all estimates or opinions of 
value61— and second, a party’s intentions about the 
acceptable settlement of a claim.  
These two categories cover a variety of statements 
which are often made in mediation, such as inflated or 
deflated offers, counteroffers, and concessions; 
representations regarding clients' settlement intentions; false 
estimates of value concerning bargaining subjects; and lies 
about target points.62  
The breadth of these categories is problematic.  For 
example, one could interpret the first category to allow a 
lawyer to lie to the mediator, the opponent, and the 
opponent’s client about the value of a property or 
transaction—even if that is the central issue in the 
mediation—because such an estimate is not regarded as 
material.  However, if a statement’s materiality depends on 
 
60 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.1 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
61 Don Peters, When Lawyers Move Their Lips: Truthfulness in Mediation and 
a Modest Proposal, J. DISP. RESOL. 119, 129 (2007).  By contrast, Australian 
lawyers would likely regard such statements as containing all the elements of 
the common law cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation: first, a false 
statement; second, knowingly made; third, for the purposes of inducing the 
representee to rely on the false statement and gaining a material advantage for 
the representor. 
62 Peters, supra note 61, at 129. 
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the context in which it is made, and the central issue is that 
property or transaction, one might think that such a statement 
would be highly material. 
As this example shows, regardless of the 
importance of such information in the unique circumstances 
of each mediation, these categories suggest that it is non-
material—therefore opening “a door for lawyers to lie when 
negotiating.”63  These exceptions to materiality accept that 
disingenuous behavior is indigenous to most legal 
negotiations. 
The Comment’s use of “ordinarily” suggests that 
statements falling within these categories may, in some 
circumstances, concern material facts.  However, the 
Comment fails to explain what circumstances make a 
difference and why.  It therefore exacerbates the confusion. 
ii) Case Law Dealing with Model Rule 
4.1 
Several courts have grappled with the meaning of 
Model Rule 4.1(a).  The Federal District Court for the 
District of Maryland has explained: “[w]hile the legal 
journals engage in some hand-wringing about the vagueness 
of this aspect of Rule 4.1, in reality, it seldom is a difficult 
task to determine whether a fact is material to a particular 
negotiation.64  In cases of real doubt, disciplinary 
committees and ultimately the courts will decide.”65   
Courts provide guidance for these “cases of real 
doubt.”  Courts have held that a fact is material if it 
“reasonably may be viewed as important to a fair 
understanding of what is being given up and, in return, 
 
63 Peters, supra note 61, at 129 (quoting James J. Alfini, Settlement Ethics and 
Lawyering in ADR Proceedings: A Proposal to Revise Rule 4.1, 19 N. ILL. U. 
L. REV. 255, 267 (1999)). 
64 Ausherman v. Bank of America Corp., 212 F. Supp. 2d 435, 449 (D. Md. 
2002). 
65 Ausherman, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 449. 
21
Angyal and Saady: Legal Lying?
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2021
[Vol. 21: 355, 2021]                                                               Legal Lying? 
                                             PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
 
 376 
gained by the settlement.”66  Similarly, courts have 
concluded that a fact is material if it could or would influence 
the hearer’s decision-making process.67  For example, it has 
been held to be material for a lawyer to tell third parties to 
comply with an invalid subpoena,68 and for a lawyer to 
incorrectly tell the opposing birth father that the relevant 
child would not be adopted without the birth father’s consent 
during adoption proceedings.69  However, courts have 
determined that it is not necessary to prove the statement 
actually influenced the hearer under Model Rule 4.1.70  
Courts have also suggested that the overriding consideration 
when assessing the materiality of a fact is achieving 
“justice;” this being “a fairly negotiated resolution based on 
candor and integrity with respect to all material 
representations.”71  
In applying the above principles to determine the 
materiality of a statement of fact or omission, the Federal 
District Court for the District of Maryland proposed a four-
step approach.  First, to identify the impugned statement of 
fact or omission; second, determine if it is untrue or 
deceptively incomplete in any significant respect; third, 
determine, if reasonably viewed, it is important to the subject 
being negotiated; and fourth, determine if the attorney knew 
or should have known that the statement was untrue at the 
time it was made.72  
These decisions do little to assist in practice because 
they are limited to their specific circumstances.  They do not 
assist a lawyer–negotiator in determining, in the heat of a 
 
66 Ausherman, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 449. 
67 See In re Merkel, 138 P.3d 847 (Or. 2006). 
68 Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Maryland v. Cocco, 109 A.3d 1176 (Md. 
2015). 
69 In re Krigel, 480 S.W.3d 294 (Mo. 2016). 
70 In re Winthrop, 848 N.E.2d 961 (Ill. 2006); In re Pizur, 84 N.E.3d 627 (Ind. 
2017). 
71 Ausherman, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 449; U.S. v. Shaffer Equipment Company, 11 
F.3d 450, 457-58 (4th Cir. 1993). 
72 Ausherman, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 451. 
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mediation, whether Model Rule 4.1(a) permits a false 
statement. 
iii) ABA Formal Ethics Opinion 06-439 
Apart from the Comment and case law, ABA’s 
Formal Ethics Opinion 06-439 also deals with Model Rule 
4.1(a)—which is a 2006, five-page formal opinion with 
twenty-two footnotes.73  The Opinion intends to explain the 
meaning of Model Rule 4.1.  Again, the perceived need for 
such a detailed document dealing with the meaning of a one-
sentence rule is an acknowledgement of the difficulty of 
interpreting it.   
The Opinion specifically addresses the lawyer’s 
obligation to be truthful when making statements on behalf 
of a client at a mediation.74  It repeats the Comment’s 
circumstance-dependent test.75  But the Opinion otherwise 
makes no reference to circumstances.  Instead, it relies on 
the proposition that statements departing from the truth by 
exaggeration of strengths or deemphasis of weaknesses are 
posturing or puffing—namely they “are statements upon 
which parties to a negotiation ordinarily would not be 
expected justifiably to rely, and must be distinguished from 
false statements of material fact.”76  It therefore shifts the 
focus from the circumstances in which the statement is made 
to the likelihood of the recipient relying on it.   
 The Opinion does not explain why a party to whom 
a false statement is made would not be expected to rely on 
it, nor how to distinguish such false statements from ones on 
which reliance will be placed.77  Nor does the Opinion 
explain why a lawyer–negotiator would bother to make a 
 
73 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 06-439 (2006).  
74 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 06-439 (2006). 
75 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 06-439 (2006). 
76 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 06-439 (2006). 
77 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 06-439 (2006). 
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statement which her or his opponent and client were not 
expected to rely on.78  
Additionally, the Opinion says that statements 
about a party’s bottom line, a lawyer’s settlement authority, 
and the death of a client are “material,” but that statements 
about negotiating goals, willingness to compromise, or a 
client’s bargaining position are not.79  It seems extremely 
difficult to distinguish between these sets of statements—for 
example, between statements about a party’s bottom line and 
statements about its negotiating goals.  
The Opinion also claims that Comment C to section 
98 of The Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing 
Lawyers “echoes the principles underlying Comment [2] to 
Rule 4.1.”80  However, the Opinion then misquotes 
Comment C to the Restatement, leaving the reader with no 
coherent statement of principle.81  
Considering all of the above, the Opinion leaves the 
reader no wiser about the meaning of Rule 4.1(a).  
iv) The Restatement (Third) of The Law 
Governing Lawyers  
Model Rule 4.1(a) is also dealt with by the 
Restatement.82  Section 98 of the Restatement and the 
comments attached to it provide a test for determining 
whether Rule 4.1(a) prohibits a lawyer from making a 
statement that is false.83  But the test appears completely 
unworkable in practice, for reasons explained below.  
According to Comment C, whether a statement 
should be characterized as a false statement of fact or law 
 
78 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 06-439 (2006). 
79 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 06-439 (2006). 
80 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 06-439 (2006). 
81 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 06-439 (2006). 
82 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 98 cmt. c (Am. Law 
Inst. 2000). 
83 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 98 cmt. c (Am. Law 
Inst. 2000). 
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depends on whether it is “reasonably apparent”84 that the 
listener-to-be would regard the statement as one of three 
possible alternatives: (1) one of fact, (2) based on the 
speaker's knowledge of facts reasonably implied by the 
statement, or (3) merely an expression of the speaker's state 
of mind.85 
While the Comment does not make this explicit, it 
seems clear that the first two types of statements are 
statements of fact, and the third type is not a statement of 
fact.  The Comment thus suggests that the first two types 
might (if they are false and about something “material”) be 
forbidden by Model Rule 4.1(a) while the third type seems 
to be the only permissible form of false statement.  
The Restatement says that assessing which type of 
statement is involved requires the speaker-to-be (i.e., the 
lawyer) to weigh “the circumstances in which the statement 
is made”—particularly seven factors—before making the 
statement.86  These factors are: 
1. The past relationship of the negotiating 
persons; 
2. Their apparent sophistication; 
3. The plausibility of the statement on its face; 
4. The phrasing of the statement; 
5. Related communication between the persons 
involved; 
6. The known negotiating practices of the 
community in which both are negotiating; 
and  
 
84 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 98 cmt. c (Am. Law 
Inst. 2000). 
85 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 98 cmt. c (Am. Law 
Inst. 2000). 
86 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 98 cmt. c (Am. Law 
Inst. 2000). 
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7. Similar circumstances.87  
Neither the meaning nor the relevance of these 
factors is explained, and some are obscure.  For example, 
what are “similar circumstances”?  Whatever they are, do 
they tend to make the statement more or less likely to be 
perceived as a statement of fact?  The latter question also 
arises in relation to the “sophistication” of the listener-to-be.  
These are serious problems.  But what makes the 
test propounded by Comment C unworkable in practice is 
that, before making a false statement in the heat of 
negotiations, the speaker-to-be must rapidly use what 
Australian courts call a “multi-factorial approach” to 
determine whether the recipient-to-be of the statement is 
likely to treat it as a statement of fact (in which case the 
speaker-to-be must be truthful if it is a “material” fact) or not 
(in which case the speaker-to-be is free to lie). 88  
The task imposed by the Comment C test is even 
more burdensome than it first appears.  For example, it is 
common to have twenty people in a mediation room during 
construction disputes in which defendants have 
counterclaimed, which joins other parties and their legal 
representatives.  The test set out in Comment C would 
require a lawyer for a party to perform the multi–factorial 
analysis in relation to every person present before making a 
statement—because the statement is not permitted unless it 
falls into the third category with respect to every person 
present.  
Given these problems, the explanation in section 98 
of the Restatement of how Model Rule 4.1(a) is to be applied 
adds further confusion to an already confusing topic.  
 
87 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 98 cmt. c (Am. Law 
Inst. 2000). 
88 See, e.g., Caltex Refineries (Qld) Pty Ltd. v Stavar (2009) 259 ALR 616 [100] 
(Allsop P), [174] (Basten JA), [241] (Simpson J) (Austl.) (using a multi-
factorial analysis to determine whether a refinery that employed Mr. Stavar to 
lag pipes with asbestos owed a novel duty of care to his wife, who developed 
malignant mesothelioma from washing his work clothes laden with asbestos). 
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Even if the Restatement test were workable, the 
writers ask the obvious question: if the speaker-to-be is free 
to lie only when it is reasonably apparent that the recipient-
to-be will not treat their statement seriously, regarding it as 
hyperbole or a reflection of the speaker’s state of mind, why 
bother?89  In particular, why take the risk of breaching Model 
Rule 4.1(a) by inadvertently telling a lie about a material 
fact, given that the best outcome for the lawyer is using their 
freedom to lie to a person who will not take the lie seriously?  
The writers suggest that it would take much less effort, and 
certainly be less risky, to tell the truth.  
The writers also suggest that the Restatement test 
negatively impacts the value and integrity of mediation as a 
dispute resolution process.  Its practical effect is that a 
prudent listener who is aware of the test is likely to assume 
that everything they are told by the opposing lawyer is a lie.  
This is not only detrimental to lawyers’ reputations, but it 
also makes mediation—a structured negotiation—much less 
efficient than if everyone present could assume that they 
were being told the truth.  
The writers suggest that further attempts by the 
ABA or the Restatement to delineate the circumstances in 
which lawyers can make false statements during 
negotiations would be futile.  This is because the exercise is 
inherently self-contradictory.  False statements are justified 
by saying that they “are statements upon which parties to a 
negotiation ordinarily would not be expected justifiably to 
rely”90 and by saying that “[u]nder generally accepted 
conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements 
ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact.”91  
Thus, the making of false statements is justified by asserting 
 
89 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 98 cmt. c (Am. Law 
Inst. 2000). 
90 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 06-439 (2006). 
91 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 06-439 (2006). 
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that the recipient of the statements will not be harmed by 
them because they will not rely on them and/or will not 
regard them as communicating factual material.  
The obvious problem with this defense of false 
statements is that, if they are trivialized to this extent, there is 
little if any point in making them.  But, to the extent that more 
substantive false statements are permitted, the damage caused 
by them will increase and the ABA’s position will be seen to 
be morally wrong.  
In short, there is an inescapable dilemma resulting 
from allowing some false statements: The more trivial the 
permitted false statements are, the less point there is in 
making them.  And the more substantive the permitted false 
statements are, the greater the damage they will cause to the 
recipients and to the moral authority of U.S. lawyers.  
This explains why neither Model Rule 4.1(a) nor the 
relevant commentary brighten the line between what is 
impermissible lying and permissible puffing or posturing 
and why.92  There is only one escape from the dilemma: the 
simple stratagem of prohibiting false statements by lawyers. 
Further, any possible advantage accruing to a 
lawyer from the ability to tell lies during a mediation can 
easily be nullified by a well-advised opponent who says to 
them, preferably in writing, before the start of the mediation 
something to the following effect:  
First, I understand that Model Rule 4.1(a) permits 
you to lie during our negotiations about non-
material facts.  We are putting you on notice that, 
throughout our negotiations, we will assume that all 
statements you make to us concern material facts 
and, therefore, that you are obliged to be truthful in 
making them.  Second, if you wish to make any 
statements of non-material facts, we require you to 
state in advance that you are about to do this, and 
 
92 JOHN W. COOLEY, MEDIATION ADVOCACY 150 (National Institute for Trial 
Advocacy ed., 1st ed. 1996) [hereinafter COOLEY, MEDIATION ADVOCACY]. 
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we are informing you now that we will not believe 
those statements because you are permitted to lie 
when making them.  Third, if you disagree with 
these rules of engagement, please let us know 
before we start negotiating.  In the absence of any 
articulated disagreement, we will assume that you 
have agreed to be bound by these rules.  If you are 
not prepared to agree to these rules of engagement, 
we will assume that you are lying throughout the 
mediation and will not believe anything you say. 
 
vi.) Further Comparative Analysis Of The 
Australian Rules And Model Rule 4.1(a) 
 First, both sets of rules use a largely subjective 
frame of analysis—focusing on knowing conduct (although 
knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances).  The 
terms of the relevant rules focus on the state of mind of the 
relevant lawyer (except for the suggestion in The 
Restatement to focus on the recipient’s mind).93  For 
example, the rules therefore do not prohibit innocent 
misrepresentation or the making of a false or misleading 
statement which the lawyer did not know to be such at the 
time of making nor after it.94  
 This frame of analysis can be quite problematic in 
determining any breach of the relevant rules, because it 
allows lawyers to plead their lack of knowledge prior to 
making any false or misleading statements, and it forces 
 
93 E.g., Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 98 cmt. c (Am. 
Law Inst. 2000) (“Whether a misstatement should be so characterized depends 
on whether it is reasonably apparent that the person to whom the statement is 
addressed would regard the statement as one of fact or based on the speaker's 
knowledge of facts reasonably implied by the statement or as merely an 
expression of the speaker's state of mind.”). 
94 See, e.g., Australian Barristers’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 24 (Austl.) (stating 
when misrepresentation or a misleading statement is made to the mediator, the 
obligation not to deceive is absolute). 
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prosecuting authorities to produce objective evidence to 
prove the impugned lawyer’s knowledge.  This may also 
encourage lawyer negligence, as lawyers may be encouraged 
to refrain from undertaking due diligence (that a reasonable 
lawyer in their position would have taken) to confirm the 
truthfulness of a statement they make in mediation.  
 However, extending the rule to negligent falsity or 
misleading statements would appear to significantly broaden 
the reach of the rule, precipitate disciplinary litigation and 
complicate the relevant tribunals’ and courts’ inquiries in 
such litigation.  So, the current approach would seem to 
strike an appropriate balance between these two competing 
interests. 
 Second, an issue, which is not squarely addressed in 
Model Rule 4.1 or the relevant Australian rules, is whether 
lawyers are obliged to correct false or misleading statements 
made by their clients during mediation, or by mediators.  In 
relation to their client, given that the lawyer is essentially a 
unified party with their client, it would appear that the 
relevant rules require correction under Solicitors Rules 19.2 
and 22.2, and Model Rule 4.1.95  Otherwise, it would allow 
a lawyer to instruct their client to disseminate false or 
misleading statements with impunity under the ethical rules.  
But, for Australian solicitors, this interpretation is 
complicated by Solicitors Rule 19.3 which provides that a 
solicitor will not make a misleading statement to a mediator 
simply by failing to correct an error in a statement by “any 
other person”—including the lawyer’s client.96  While this 
seemingly leaves it open for a solicitor to make such an 
instruction to their client, other obligations, such as in 
section 18 of the ACL, are likely to prevent the relevant 
solicitor from doing so.97 
 
95 Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 19.2, 22.2 (Austl.); MODEL 
RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.1 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
96 Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 19.3 (Austl.). 
97 Australian Consumer Law 2010 (Cth) s 18 (Austrl.). 
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 The situation is a little different for the mediator.  In 
Australia, Solicitors Rule 19.2 would apply to require the 
lawyer to “take all necessary steps” to correct a misleading 
statement made by the lawyer to the mediator after becoming 
aware of its misleading nature.98  There is no equivalent rule 
in the United States, so a lawyer who unknowingly made a 
false statement of material fact to the mediator has no 
obligation to correct the statement after finding out that it 
was false.  As a result, the mediator could continue to 
conduct the mediation on the basis of the false statement.  
This is obviously problematic. 
 Third, it is clear from above that the Australian 
obligations are more comprehensive than their U.S. 
equivalents.  The Australian obligations relating to 
truthfulness are not limited to material facts—providing a 
broader obligation by covering all types of facts.  They also 
extend to expressly prohibiting deception and reckless 
misleading of the mediator—again holding lawyers to a 
higher standard of truthfulness.  
 While there are other textual differences between 
the jurisdictions’ rules, there is likely to be little difference 
in their practical application.  For example, while the 
Australian obligations clarify that failure to correct an 
opponent or other person in mediation is not misleading 
conduct and the Model Rules are silent on this issue, the lack 
of express provisions preventing such silence suggests that 
it would be allowed in the United States.  Additionally, a 
Solicitors Rule 34.1.1 statement which grossly exceeds the 
legitimate assertion of a client’s rights and which misleads 
the other person may be considered to also be a false 
material statement to a third person under Model Rule 4.1.99  
 
98 Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 19.2 (Austl.). 
99 Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 34.1.1 (Austl.); MODEL RULES 
OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.1 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
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So, there may be some overlap, despite the Model Rules not 
being couched in the same terms, nor as comprehensively.  
 However, as explained below, the practical 
application and understanding of these sets of rules in 
Australia and the United States fundamentally differ.  While 
the Law Council of Australia guidelines do not prohibit 
puffing, in the commentary to section 6.2, the Guidelines 
warn lawyers to “never mislead and be careful of puffing”.100  
Similarly, the Solicitors Rules limit the extent and topics of 
puffing or overstatement by providing in Rule 34.1.1 that 
lawyers cannot make a statement which “grossly exceeds the 
legitimate assertion” of their client’s rights or 
entitlements.101  Despite being conducive to a limited scope 
of puffing, these regulations appear hostile to lying and 
active misleading.  So, while “some puffing, overstatement 
and deception are normal in negotiation”,102 there is 
uncertainty about how far a lawyer can go in doing so.103  
Unsurprisingly, it appears that lawyers take advantage of this 
uncertainty, as it has been stated that in Australia there 
remains “anecdotal evidence that many lawyers lie routinely 
in their negotiation practice.”104  Lankhani has even 
suggested that lying and deception are inherent to mediation, 
being an instinctive human behavior.105  
 The U.S. position treats puffing as acceptable 
mediation practice and goes much further than the Australian 
position by accepting lying and active misleading as 
legitimate tactics.  U.S. scholar Cooley has suggested that 
 
100 LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA, supra note 13, at r. 6.2(a). 
101 Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 34.1.1 (Austl.). 
102 BOBETTE WOLSKI ET AL., SKILLS, ETHICS, AND VALUES FOR LEGAL 
PRACTICE 530 (Lawbook Co. ed., 2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter WOLSKI ET AL., 
SKILLS, ETHICS, AND VALUES]. 
103 SAMANTHA HARDY & OLIVIA RUNDLE, MEDIATION FOR LAWYERS 221 
(CCH Australia Ltd. ed., 2010). 
104 HARDY & RUNDLE, supra note 103, at 221.  
105 Avnita Lakhani, The Truth about Lying as a Negotiation Tactic: Where 
Business, Ethics, and Law Collide … or Do They?: Part 2, 9 ADR BULL. 133 
(2007). 
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under the ethical rules “lawyers may not lie for clients . . . 
when to do so would be civilly actionable”.106  This 
commentary reflects the common position in the United 
States that Model Rule 4.1 goes little further (if at all) than 
the applicable statutory and common law (such as relating to 
fraud and misrepresentation), in contrast to the Australian 
rules which seem to hold lawyers to a higher standard of 
truthfulness than the generally applicable Australian 
statutory and common law. 
Reflecting this common position, the ABA’s 
Formal Ethics Opinion 06-439 explains that it is not unusual 
in a negotiation for a party, directly or through counsel, to 
make a statement about its position that is less than entirely 
forthcoming, and to exaggerate the strength of its factual or 
legal position.107  Burns concluded that it is permissible 
under the Model Rules to actively mislead an opponent as to 
one’s bottom line and use false statements of immaterial 
facts.108  Albeit writing in 1980, White similarly explained 
that the “critical difference between those who are successful 
negotiators and those who are not lies in this capacity both 
to mislead and not to be misled” and that “a careful 
examination of the behavior of even the most forthright, 
honest, and trustworthy negotiators will show them actively 
 
106 COOLEY, MEDIATION ADVOCACY, supra note 92, at 42. 
107 See Resolution Systems Institute, Formal Opinion 06-439: Lawyer's 
Obligation of Truthfulness When Representing a Client in Negotiation: 
Application to Caucused Mediation, Institute, 
https://www.aboutrsi.org/library/formal-opinion-06-439-lawyers-obligation-
of-truthfulness-when-representing-a-client-in-negotiation-application-to-
caucused-mediation (“ABA Formal Opinion 06-439 discusses ‘the obligation 
of a lawyer to be truthful when making statements on behalf of clients in 
negotiations, including the specialized form of negotiation known as caucused 
mediation.’ The opinion allows for ‘posturing’ or ‘puffing’ by parties to the 
negotiation.  This includes understating their willingness to make concessions 
and exaggerating their strengths.  These are not considered false statements of 
material fact under Model Rule 3.3 or 4.1.”) 
108 Robert P. Burns, Some Ethical Issues Surrounding Mediation, 70 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 691, 694 (2001–2002). 
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engaged in misleading their opponents.”109  He even goes on 
to state that misleading “is the essence of negotiation.”110  
Prominent scholar Menkel-Meadow posited that 
oppositional presentation in mediation inevitably leads to 
distortion of the truth by encouraging parties to make 
extreme claims, avoid any potentially harmful facts, and 
manipulate information.111  Riley took this further by stating 
that lying is “not the province of a few ‘unethical lawyers’ 
who operate on the margins of the profession.  It is a 
permanent feature of advocacy and thus of almost the entire 
province of law.”112  Analogously, Wetlaufer stated that 
“lying can be highly effective” as it “offers significant 
distributive advantages to the liar,” describing it as a 
“coherent and often effective strategy” which if never used 
“may place a negotiator at a systematic and sometimes 
overwhelming disadvantage.”113  He even posited that “any 
number of lies, including those involving reservation prices 
and opinions that are both useful and virtually 
undiscoverable.”114 
Abramson asserts the most interesting 
proposition.115  He seems to regard the use of “tricks”—
including lying about material facts, arriving at mediation 
without sufficient settlement authority, and misleading 
through intentional ambiguity—as a choice open to U.S. 
lawyers in fashioning an effective negotiation style for 
 
109 James J. White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in 
Negotiation, AM. BAR FOUND. RSCH. J. 926, 927 (1980). 
110 White, supra note 109, at 928. 
111 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble With the Adversary System in a 
Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 21–22 (1996). 
112 Peter Reilly, Was Machiavelli Right? Lying in Negotiation and the Art of 
Defensive Self-Help, 24 OHIO STATE. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 481, 483–484 (2008). 
113 Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations, 75 IOWA L. REV. 
1219, 1230 (1990). 
114 Wetlaufer, supra note 113, at 1230. 
115 Hal Abramson, Fashioning an Effective Negotiation Style: Choosing 
Between Good Practices, Tactics, and Tricks, 23 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 319 
(2018). 
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themselves at mediation.116  Such a position appears to 
conflict with some of the Model Rules identified above, and 
starkly contrasts with the Australian Rules and the 
Australian commentators’ views set out above.  
An analysis of relevant case law further illustrates 
the gulf between Australia and the United States.  Three 
leading cases in Australia are Legal Services Commissioner 
v Mullins,117 Legal Services Commissioner v Garrett,118 and 
Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee v Fleming.119  
Mullins and Garrett were two cases involving a mediation 
where Mullins and Garrett, as legal representatives 
(respectively, as a barrister and solicitor), represented a 
client rendered paraplegic in an automobile accident.120  
Before the mediation, they gave the driver of the other car’s 
insurer detailed schedules of damages based on the normal 
life expectancy of a paraplegic of their client’s age.121  
However, the day before the mediation, their client revealed 
that he had just been diagnosed with advanced cancer.122  
Their client also instructed them not to reveal this diagnosis 
unless the law required them to.123  At the mediation, Mullins 
and Garrett continued to rely on the schedules of damages 
served earlier, therefore in effect representing that they were 
not aware of any material change in their client’s life 
expectancy.124  Both parties faced disciplinary action, where 
 
116Abramson, supra note 115, at 327–29. 
117 [2006] LPT 012, 
https://applications.lsc.qld.gov.au/document/download/10784. 
118 [2009] LPT 12. 
119 [2006] WASAT 352. See Campbell Bridge SC, Effective and Ethical 
Negotiations, NSW Bar Assoc., 
https://nswbar.asn.au/docs/professional/prof_dev/BPC/course_files/Effective_
and_Ethical_Settlement_Negotiations_-_Bridge_SC_updated_2016.pdf. 
120 Mullins [2006] LPT 012 at ¶2. 
121 Mullins [2006] LPT 012 at ¶1–6. 
122 Mullins [2006] LPT 012 at ¶9. 
123 Mullins [2006] LPT 012 at ¶10. 
124 Mullins [2006] LPT 012 at ¶12–15. 
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Mullins was held to have committed “intentional deception” 
and “fraudulent deception” under the Queensland State 
Barristers Rules 51 and 52 (almost identical to Solicitors 
Rules 22.1 and 22.2), and Garrett was held similarly 
responsible under the relevant Queensland state solicitors 
rules.125  Fleming was a solicitor acting for an estate who 
was held to have breached Rule 3.1 of the Western 
Australian State Professional Conduct Rules by attempting 
to further his client's case by unfair or dishonest means—
after representing that the a will was enforceable when in 
fact it was an informal will (unenforceable without a court 
order regularizing it)—despite this course of action 
according with his client’s instructions.126  The Tribunal 
suggested that honesty, fairness and integrity were even 
more important in negotiations between practitioners than in 
court because:  
they are conducted outside the Court and 
are beyond the control which a judge 
hearing the matter might otherwise 
exercise over the practitioners involved.  
Outside the trial process, there is no 
impartial adjudicator to ‘find the truth’ 
between the opposing assertions . . . A level 
of trust between the advisers involved is 
therefore essential.127 
Three U.S. examples paint a very different picture.  
The first case, Otto v. Hearst Communications,128 involved 
the settlement conference of a copyright claim relating to a 
photo taken of President Trump at a wedding in 2017.  At 
the conference, the plaintiff’s lawyers allegedly violated 
their ethical obligations by producing misleading documents 
about the licensing of the photo and by giving misleading 
 
125 Mullins [2006] LPT 012 at ¶30–31. 
126 Bridge, supra note 119, at ¶23–24. 
127 [2006] WASAT 352 [76].  
128 No. 17-CV-4712 (GHW) (JLC), U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35051 (S.D.N.Y Feb. 21, 
2019). 
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answers to questions about their client’s settlement of related 
claims to allegedly inflate the settlement amount.129  
However, in contrast to the results of Mullins and Fleming, 
the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New 
York refused to impose sanctions on the relevant lawyers, 
finding on the evidence presented that their conduct 
amounted to posturing and did not constitute 
misrepresentation nor acting in bad faith.130  Interestingly, 
the court held that while advocates “may not lie to opposing 
counsel about a fact that is material to the resolution of the 
case . . . recognizing where the line is to be drawn between 
ethical and unethical behavior during the negotiation process 
can be difficult to discern.”131  The court then “strongly” 
cautioned the plaintiff’s lawyers “to be mindful of 
overplaying their hands (or worse) during settlement 
negotiations.” 132 
Second, in Alexsam Incorporated v. WildCard 
Systems Incorporated133 the Federal District Court for the 
Southern District of Florida held that an attorney did not 
breach Model Rule 4.1, nor act in bad faith, by failing to 
disclose to the other party at mediation that his client had 
filed a separate complaint in state court that was unknown to 
that other party at the time of the mediation. This is similar 
to the lawyers’ silence about their client’s life expectancy in 
Mullins.  However, the federal district court reached a 
completely different result by not finding a breach of the 
ethical rules.134 
 
129 Otto, LEXIS 35051 at *12. 
130 Bridge, supra note 119, at ¶23–24; Otto, LEXIS 35051 at *23. 
131Otto, LEXIS 35051 at *25, (quoting Ausherman v. Bank of America Corp., 
212 F. Supp. 2d 435, 443–444, 446 (D. Md. 2002)). 
132 Otto, LEXIS 35051 at *36. 
133 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24347 (S.D.Fla. 2019). 
134 Alexsam, Inc. v. WildCard Sys., Inc., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24347, at 28–
29 (2019). 
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 Third, in a hypothetical Pennsylvanian case similar 
to Mullins and Fleming, a client knew and told their lawyer 
that they only had one year to live because of a non-work 
related illness but sought to accept an offer for payment of 
an amount equivalent to three years of workers’ 
compensation.135  In an ethics opinion, the Pennsylvania Bar 
Association’s Committee on Ethics determined that the 
lawyer did not need to disclose this, mainly because Model 
Rule 4.1 was not engaged as no representation had been 
made to the opposing side and the information provided by 
the client was protected by confidentiality.136  This contrasts 
with the results in the Australian cases above. 137 
 Some U.S. cases, however, have reached similar 
conclusions to the Australian cases.138  For example, a 
district court held a lawyer to have breached Model Rule 4.1 
by serving and relying on an expert’s damages report that he 
knew was misleading.139  In In Re Rosen, a lawyer breached 
Model Rule 4.1 by making misrepresentations which led an 
insurance company to believe his deceased client was still 
alive.140  In another case, an attorney was suspended for 
breaching the predecessor to Model Rule 4.1 by failing to 
disclose the existence of a $1 million umbrella policy while 
negotiating the reduction of a hospital’s lien against the 
proceeds of personal injury recovery by his plaintiff 
client.141 
 These cases illustrate that findings differ depending 
on the circumstances in which a statement is made, and the 
 
135 Pa. Bar. Ass’n. Comm. on Legal Ethics & Pro. Resp., Informal Op. 2001-26 
(April 26, 2001). 
136 Pa. Bar. Ass’n. Comm. on Legal Ethics & Pro. Resp., Informal Op. 2001-26 
(April 26, 2001). 
137 Pa. Bar. Ass’n. Comm. on Legal Ethics & Pro. Resp., Informal Op. 2001-26 
(April 26, 2001). 
138 In re Rosen, 198 P.3d 116, 121 (Colo. 2008); see Nebraska State Bar 
Association v. Addison, 412 N.W.2d 855, 856 (Neb. 1987).  
139 In re Filosa, 976 F. Supp. 2d 460, 465–66 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
140 Rosen, 198 P.3d at 121. 
141 Nebraska State Bar Association, 412 N.W.2d at 856. 
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perception of the relevant adjudicative body.  They also 
illustrate the contrasting perceptions of Australian and U.S. 
adjudicative bodies about what constitutes misconduct for 
making false or misleading statements, or for remaining 
silent where such silence would be misleading.  The judicial 
perceptions are largely reflected in the relevant academic 
commentary set out above.  
 The U.S. judicial and academic acceptance of lying 
and active misleading in mediation and negotiation is not a 
feature of Australian jurisprudence.142  Australian 
academics recognize that various deceptive tactics, such as 
settlement point deception and puffing, are legitimate and 
often necessary in mediation but fall short of condoning 
tactics such as lying.143  Most Australian attorneys do not 
consider lying a legitimate form of advocacy largely because 
of Rules reviewed in this article, the precedent set by the 
cases above, and the operation of consumer protection 
statutes such as the ACL which are likely to prohibit 
lying.144 
 The Australian approach is more appropriate 
largely because it maintains the integrity of the process of 
mediation and the reputation of the legal profession involved 
in mediation policies which will be explained further below 
in Part Two.  Although some commentators have argued that 
lawyers should be obliged to be candid at mediations and 
fully disclose every matter within their knowledge (in terms 
of “maintaining ‘total candor,’”145 “forbidding all 
 
142 Wolski, supra note 14. See also Bobette Wolski, The Truth About Honesty 
and Candour in Mediation: What the Tribunal Left Unsaid in the Mullins Case, 
36 MELB. U. L. REV. 706, 714 (2012) [hereinafter Wolski, The Truth]. 
143 Wolski, The Truth, supra note 142, at 717. 
144 Abbe Smith, Defending the Unpopular Down-Under, 30 MELB. U. L. REV. 
495, 537–538 (2006). 
145 Cooley, supra note 56, at 96 (quoting Waiter W. Steele, Deceptive 
Negotiating and High-Toned Morality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1387, 1403 (1986)). 
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deception,”146 and “minimizing ‘an unreasonable risk of 
harm’”),147 the writers do not agree with such propositions 
because they consider them to be unrealistic, rid mediation 
of its adversarial nature, and go beyond the requirements set 
by the relevant regulations.148  They would also likely be 
against lawyers’ duties to serve their clients’ interests and 
provide the opposing party with comparative advantage. 
 Rather, the writers’ view is simply that lawyers 
should be obliged to be truthful when representing a client 
at mediation.  While some amendments to the regulations of 
truthfulness may be necessary (see Part Two), lawyers 
should simultaneously focus on becoming more cognizant 
of the ethical boundaries set by the relevant regulations in 
respect to truth and behave accordingly.  There will be 
outliers who still take advantage of the blurry line between 
when a lawyer must tell the truth and when they can lie.  But 
one can hope that lawyers will take heed of their expected 
conduct and roles as administrators of justice and err on the 
side of caution in relation to these boundaries.  
 From a practical perspective, the Australian 
approach to lying and active misleading as negotiation 
tactics better serves the interests of lawyers themselves.  
Especially in smaller or specialized legal communities, 
lawyers quickly develop a reputation based on previous 
negotiation behavior.149  Such a reputation is particularly 
important to lawyers’ practice and how they are perceived 
by their peers.150  Toeing the line of truth in mediation is 
likely to detrimentally affect the image of the lawyers and 
participants involved.  A speaker’s overstatement, 
 
146 Cooley, supra note 56, at 96 (citing See Geoffrey M. Peters, The Use of Lies 
in Negotiation, 48 OHIO STATE L.J. 1, 50 (1987)) 
147 Cooley, supra note 56, at 96 (quoting Rex R. Perschbacher, Regulating 
Lawyers' Negotiations, 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 75, 133-34 (1985)).  
148 HOWARD RAIFFA, LECTURES ON NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS 11 (PON Books, 
1996); see also Reed E. Loder, Moral Truthseeking and the Virtuous 
Negotiator, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 45 (1994). 
149 Reilly, supra note 57, at 526. 
150 HARDY & RUNDLE, supra note 49, at 224. 
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embellishment, or exaggeration of the truth usually inspires 
listeners to be apprehensive and cautious about accepting the 
speaker’s message.151  If a speaker misrepresents an 
important fact, even innocently, listeners may lose 
confidence in the speaker’s ability to be truthful, may refuse 
to communicate with the speaker, or may become 
vindictive.152  Peters states, “[e]ffective lawyers know that 
they do not need to lie to negotiate effectively,” referencing 
a connection in the relevant research between honest 
negotiating and perceived effectiveness.153  
Considering one of Aristotle’s three artistic means 
of persuasion, “pathos” (i.e., emotions aroused in a 
speaker’s audience), a speaker’s character is judged 
according to their personal qualities and the stereotypes, 
which relate to them.154  Lawyers should be constantly 
aware of the cultural impact untrustworthiness has on their 
ability to persuade their audience and, therefore, to 
effectively represent their clients.  As Cooley explains, 
mediation advocates “need to have an intimate 
understanding of the affective component of persuasion, 
pathos.”155  While a lawyer might get away with lying once 
or twice, in the long term, their reputation is likely to precede 
them and result in utter distrust of everything said unless it 
can be independently verified.  That is scarcely conducive to 
effective and efficient negotiations or to the development 
and maintenance of a thriving legal practice.  As the Court 
perfectly encapsulated in Otto, “[l]awyers have one 
treasured possession above all else, and that is their 
reputation . . . [i]f it is squandered and lawyers become 
known for being untrustworthy, both their clients and the 
 
151 COOLEY, MEDIATION ADVOCACY, supra note 92, at 93. 
152 COOLEY, MEDIATION ADVOCACY, supra note 92, at 93. 
153 Peters, supra note 61, at 141. 
154 COOLEY, MEDIATION ADVOCACY, supra note 92, at 124–25. 
155 COOLEY, MEDIATION ADVOCACY, supra note 92, at 125. 
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Court are ill–served,”156 and their legal practices often are 
irreversibly damaged.  
 
1c)  Obligations to the courts, justice, and 
profession 
Broad, overarching duties to the relevant court 
system, administration of justice, and the legal profession 
are imposed on lawyers in both jurisdictions.157  
 
i) Australia 
Rule 3.1 of the Solicitors Rules provides that a 
“solicitor’s duty to the court and the administration of justice 
is paramount and prevails to the extent of inconsistency with 
any other duty.”158  As discussed above, “court” is defined 
as including a mediation.159  There is an additional 
obligation under Rule 5.1, which prohibits solicitors from 
engaging in conduct, in the course of practice or otherwise, 
which is likely to a material degree to “be prejudicial to . . . 
the administration of justice; or bring the profession into 
disrepute.”160  This is an extremely broad obligation, which 
applies beyond the course of a lawyer’s practice because of 
the word “otherwise” in Rule 5.1.161 
Similarly, Rule 4 of the Barristers Rules provides 
that “barristers owe their paramount duty to the 
administration of justice,” “owe duties to the courts, to their 
clients and to their barrister and solicitor colleagues,” and 
“must maintain high standards of professional conduct.”162  
This is supplemented by Rule 23, which states that barristers 
owe “an overriding duty to the court to act with 
 
156 Otto, LEXIS 35051 at *36. 
157 See, Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 5.1 (Austl.); Australian 
Barristers’ Conduct Rules 2015 (Austl.); MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT 
(AM. BAR ASS'N 1983). 
158 Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 3.1 (Austl.). 
159 See generally Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015 (Austl.). 
160 Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 5.1 (Austl.). 
161 Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 5.1 (Austl.). 
162 Australian Barristers’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 4 (Austl.). 
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independence in the interests of the administration of 
justice.”163  Again, “court” is defined as including a 
mediation. 164 
Because both the Solicitors and Barristers Rules 
render the duty to the administration of justice paramount 
over any inconsistent duty, an Australian lawyer cannot take 
refuge in their duties to their client or their duty to maintain 
confidentiality.165  Further, as stated above, it seems that 
such paramount duties are only binding while the mediator 
is present, with the different and less stringent duties 
outlined above (i.e., duties owed to the opposing lawyer, 
opposing client, and third parties) applying to the remaining 
parties after the mediator leaves the room.166 
 
ii) The United States 
There is no equivalent paramount or overarching 
duty in the Model Rules.167  The Preamble to the Model 
Rules uses broad language to reiterate the duties of lawyers 
to: demonstrate respect for the legal system and for those 
who serve it (in paragraph 5); seek improvement of the law, 
administration of justice, and the quality of service rendered 
by the legal profession (in paragraph 6); improve the law and 
the legal profession (in paragraph 7); and exemplify the legal 
profession's ideals of public service (in paragraph 7).168  The 
other relevant rule is Model Rule 8.4, which defines 
professional misconduct as engaging in “conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice” in 8.4(d).169  
 
163 Australian Barristers’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 23 (Austl.). 
164 See generally Australian Barristers’ Conduct Rules 2015 (Austl.). 
165 See, Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 5.1 (Austl.); Australian 
Barristers’ Conduct Rules 2015 (Austl.). 
166 Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 5.1 (Austl.); Australian 
Barristers’ Conduct Rules 2015 (Austl.). 
167 See generally MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS'N 1983). 
168 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS'N 1983). 
169 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS'N 1983). 
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However, there is no separate, paramount obligation relating 
to the administration of justice akin to those in the Australian 
rules.170  
It should also be noted that common law duties 
developed through case law also impose certain obligations 
on lawyers to the relevant courts and administration of 
justice in both the USA and Australia, but a detailed analysis 
of case law establishing these obligations is beyond the 
scope of this article. 
 
iii) Further Comparative Analysis 
In Australia and the USA there is no specific 
guidance which suggests that the above duties compel 
lawyers to make truthful statements at all times during 
mediation.171  There are also no cases directly dealing with 
the point.  
Nevertheless, it is submitted that in both 
jurisdictions, the above duties are broad enough to cover 
conduct during mediation, including the truthfulness of 
lawyers’ advocacy.172  This is because mediation is a process 
involving the administration of justice and one which affects 
the public perception of participating lawyers and their 
profession.173  This is especially so for court-mandated 
mediation because the process of mediation is associated 
 
170 See, Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 5.1 (Austl.); Australian 
Barristers’ Conduct Rules (Austl.). 
171 See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS'N 1983); Australian 
Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015 r. 5.1 (Austl.); Australian Barristers’ Conduct 
Rules 2015 (Austl.). 
172 See, Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 5.1 (Austl.); Australian 
Barristers’ Conduct Rules (Austl.); MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT (AM. 
BAR ASS'N 1983). 
173 See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 2.4 cmt 5, r.1.12 (AM. BAR ASS'N 
1983). 
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with the court. 174 In reality, most mediations are conducted 
in the “shadow” of the courthouse.175  
For example, allowing a lawyer to lie during 
mediation would seem inconsistent with the proper 
administration of justice.  Similarly, permitting lawyers to 
lie during mediation would seem averse to the integrity of 
the legal profession.  However, without clarification from 
rule makers or judges, the impact of these duties on 
truthfulness in mediation cannot be definitively stated.  
Again, this highlights the need for further guidance about 
how such general rules apply to mediation, or for the 
enactment of similar rules tailored to mediation.   
 
1d)  Obligations of good faith in mediation 
Regulatory schemes in both Australia and the 
United States impose “good faith” obligations on lawyers 
during mediation which “dance along the periphery” of 
truthfulness in mediation.176  They are described below.   
It is important to note that mediation agreements 
also often contain good faith terms.177  For example, the Law 
Society of New South Wales’ Model Mediation Clause 
contains a subclause 3.5.2 which provides that the parties 
must mediate “with a genuine commitment to 
participate.”178  Similarly, in New York, the Center for 
 
174 LAURENCE BOULLE, MEDIATION - PRINCIPLES PROCESS PRACTICE 143 (3d 
ed. 2005). 
175 LAURENCE BOULLE, MEDIATION - PRINCIPLES PROCESS PRACTICE 143 (3d 
ed. 2005). 
176 James K. L. Lawrence, Misrepresenting, Puffing and Bluffing: Legal, 
Ethical and Professional Standards for Negotiators and Mediation Advocates, 
29 OHIO STATE. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 35, 55 (2014). 
177 Jon Lang, Good faith in mediation – pillar or platitude? Mediation in 
Practice (June 2019), https://jonlang.com/good-faith-in-mediation-pillar-or-
platitude/. 
178 LAW SOCIETY OF NEW SOUTH WALES, 
https://www.lawsociety.com.au/sites/default/files/2018-
03/Model%20Clause.pdf, (last visited Sept. 20, 2020).  
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Creative Conflict Resolution’s Agreement to Mediate 
includes a clause stating that “I agree to make a good faith 
effort to resolve the above-referenced case.”179  These terms 
operate by force of contract, bolstering existing regulatory 
good faith obligations or filling the void where there are no 
such obligations in applicable regulation.   
 
i) Australia 
The Barristers and Solicitors Rules do not impose 
an explicit obligation on legal representatives to mediate in 
good faith.180  However, Section 27 of the Civil Procedure 
Act in New South Wales places a duty on each party in 
court-referred mediation to participate in good faith.181  
There are similar obligations in subject matter specific 
legislation such as the Farm Debt Mediation Act (in ss 
11(1)(c)(iii), 11 (2)(a)) and Dust Diseases Tribunal 
Regulation (in ss 27(1), 31(2)).182  Further, nonbinding 
standards support such obligations.  For example, the Law 
Council of Australia’s Guidelines provide in clause 2.2 that 
“Lawyers and clients should act, at all times, in good faith 
to attempt to achieve settlement of the dispute.”183 Where 
not explicitly stated, it is likely that obligations on the parties 
in mediation extend to their lawyers because the parties 
participate in the mediation wholly or partly through their 
lawyers.184  
 
179 NEW YORK CITY, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/oath/downloads/pdf/CCCR_Agreement_to_ 
Mediate_Online_MEND_Ca ses.pdf, (last visited Sept. 20, 2020). 
180 Wolski, On Mediation, supra note 19, at 21. 
181 NSW LEGISLATION, 
https://www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/whole/html/inforce/current/act-
2005-028, (last visited Sept. 20, 2020). 
182 CAN LII, https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/sc-1997-c-21/latest/sc-
1997-c-21.html; NSW, Dust Diseases Tribunal Regulation 2019, 
https://www.justice.nsw.gov.au/justicepolicy/Documents/dust-diseases-
tribunal-regulation-2019/dust-diseases-tribunal-regulation-2019.pdf.  
183 LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA, supra note 13.  
184 ROBERT ANGYAL SC, ADVOCACY AT MEDIATION, IN RESOLVING CIVIL 
DISPUTES 49 (Michael Legg ed., 2016). 
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However, there is no clear definition of good faith 
nor consideration of whether it regulates the truthfulness of 
lawyers’ advocacy in mediation.185  Undoubtedly, what 
good faith means varies amongst individuals, and as the 
cases show, judges too.186  Some commentators examined it 
through a narrow prism, labelling it as a “participation 
duty”—although there is nothing to suggest it is so limited 
in every case, particularly where regulation set out above, 
such as the Law Council of Australia’s guidelines, extends 
the obligation to “all times” in the process of settling a 
dispute.187  Others suggested that there is general agreement 
that good faith entails participating in mediation, ensuring 
someone with authority to settle is present, and not 
immediately rejecting what the other party says.188  
However, it is widely accepted that good faith 
obligations do not compel parties to act against their 
interests, nor require them to fully disclose all information 
relating to their interests, negotiation goals, and bargaining 
positions.189  Wolski also explains that in Australia and the 
United States, there is wide agreement that good faith does 
not preclude use of positional negotiation, nor require 
parties to make settlement offers.190  Further, she states that 
good faith does not require parties to possess a sincere desire 
to settle, and ultimately does not require forfeiture of a 
person’s self-interest during mediation.191  Unfortunately, 
there has been no explicit consideration of how such good 
faith provisions apply to the truthfulness of lawyers’ 
 
185 See generally Lang, supra note 177. 
186 See generally Lang, supra note 177. 
187 LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA, supra note 13.  
188 Wolski, On Mediation, supra note 19, at 22. 
189 United Group Rail Services Limited v Rail Corporation New South Wales 
(2009) 74 NSWLR 618 ¶ 76 (NSW); Masters Home Improvement Australia Pty 
Ltd v North East Solutions Pty Ltd (2017) 372 ALR 440 ¶ 99 (Vic). 
190 Wolski, supra, note 14, at 49. 
191 Wolski, supra note 14, at 50. 
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advocacy in mediation in Australia—particularly in relation 
to lying, puffing, active misleading, and misrepresentation.   
 
ii) The United States 
In the United States, twenty-two states and Guam 
have statutory requirements relating to good faith in 
mediation,192 and twenty-one Federal district courts and 
seventeen state courts have good faith requirements in their 
rules.193  Also, several federal district courts have relied on 
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as the basis 
for a good faith requirement in mediation.194  U.S. cases 
have also dealt with good faith mediation requirements, with 
Lande analyzing twenty-seven relevant cases as falling into 
five categories.195  Lande found that decisions were 
consistent—as courts always found breaches of good faith 
obligations where a party failed to attend or provide a 
required pre-mediation document, an almost even split 
where there was a failure to provide an authorized 
representative, and no breaches for all other cases.196  
However, like in Australia, there remains no direct 
consideration of how good faith obligations apply to 
regulate the truthfulness of lawyers’ advocacy in mediation. 
 
iii) Further Comparative Analysis 
Little to no attention has been given to whether the 
obligations of good faith set out above affect the truthfulness 
of lawyers’ advocacy during mediation.  It is suggested that 
such obligations actually do regulate truthfulness based on 
 
192 John Lande, Why a Good-Faith Requirement is a Bad Idea for Mediation, 
23 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 1 (2005). 
193 Lande, supra note 192. 
194 ABA Section of Dispute Resolution, Resolution on Good Faith 
Requirements for Mediators and Mediation Advocates in Court-Mandated 
Mediation Programs, 2004 A.B.A SEC. OF DISP. RESOL. 
195 John Lande, Using Dispute System Design Methods to Promote Good Faith 
Participation in Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50 UCLA L. REV. 69 
(2002). 
196 See generally Lande, supra note 195. 
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the premise that lying or actively misleading in mediation 
would constitute a party failing to participate in that 
mediation in good faith.197  The term “good faith” is broad 
enough to encompass such a reading.  Unfortunately, there 
is little judicial or academic guidance to confirm this 
interpretation. 
One of the issues in assessing good faith in 
mediation is confidentiality.  Confidentiality has prevented 
courts from scrutinizing advocates’ conduct in mediation, 
including their truthfulness, and therefore from considering 
or holding whether duties of good faith apply to advocates’ 
truthfulness during mediation.198  As the Federal District 
Court for the Southern District of New York has explained, 
“confidentiality considerations preclude a court from 
inquiring into the level of a party's participation in 
mandatory court-ordered mediation, i.e., the extent to which 
a party discusses the issues, listens to opposing  viewpoints 
and analyzes its liability.”199  Courts have therefore been left 
to the very narrow “general pattern of interpretation” of 
good faith “to require compliance with orders to attend 
mediation, provide pre-mediation memoranda, and, in some 
cases, produce organizational representatives with sufficient 
settlement authority.”200 
However, the lack of a definition of the term good 
faith is the main issue precluding any definitive statement 
that good faith duties regulate advocates’ truthfulness in 
mediation.  Most commentators agree that there is no clear 
 
197 See generally David C. Singer and Cecilie Howard, The Duty of Good Faith 
in Mediation Proceedings, 244 NEW YORK L. J. (Aug. 25, 2010), 
http://files.dorsey.com/files/upload/The%20Duty%20of%20Good%20Faith.p
df. 
198 Jeff D. Rifleman, Mediation Confidentiality, Bad Faith, Enforceability, 
Rifleman Law & Mediation (Apr. 2008), 
http://www.riflemanlaw.com/practice-areas/mediation/mediation-
confidentiality-bad-faith-enforceability. 
199 In re A.T. Reynolds & Sons Inc., 452 B.R. 374, 383–384 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
200 A.T. Reynolds & Sons Inc., 452 B.R. at 384. 
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definition, and that the relevant cases in Australia and the 
USA are difficult to reconcile.201  Some even posit that good 
faith, especially substantive, as opposed to procedural, is a 
concept that cannot ever be completely or accurately 
defined.202  Consistently with those commentators, the New 
York courts have gone so far to hold that good faith is an 
“intangible and abstract quality with no technical 
meaning.”203 
The regulation examined above avoids providing 
any guidance about the meaning of good faith.  Apart from 
the Australian and U.S. commentary and the U.S. cases 
above, the meaning of good faith remains illusory.204  This 
issue is compounded in Australia where there remains 
uncertainty about whether the test under such regulation is 
objective or subjective—as recent authority suggests an 
objective test, while older authorities mandate a subjective 
test.205 
This definitional issue is a double-edged sword.  On 
one hand, it is problematic because it fails to impose a 
uniform standard which lawyers can seek to adhere to and 
by which they can be held accountable.  It also promulgates 
confusion about its proper meaning, evident in the paragraph 
above.  On the other hand, it creates a flexible standard 
which may be interpreted as covering all sorts of mediator 
conduct.  In this way, it may also be considered a 
prophylactic obligation—deterring improper lawyer 
conduct while providing a tool for holding lawyers to 
account for their actions during mediation. 
 
201 Wolski, supra note 14, at 49 (and the sources there cited). 
202 ABA SECTION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, Resolution on Good Faith 
Requirements for Mediators and Mediation Advocates in Court-Mandated 
Mediation Programs Opinion (August 7, 2004). 
203 Martin v. Columbia Pictures Co., 133 N.Y.S.2d 469 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1953), 
473, aff’d, 283 A.D. 924 (N.Y. App. Div. 1954), aff’d, 307 N.Y. 911 (1954). 
204 Tania Sourdin, Good Faith, Bad Faith? Making an Effort in Dispute 
Resolution, 2(1) DICTUM – VICT. L. SCH. J. (2012). 
205 Angyal SC, supra note 184, at 51–55. 
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For the purposes of this article, it is critical to note 
that the courts have not yet extended the good faith 
obligation to cover truthfulness in mediation.206  It is 
submitted that this is not only because the question has not 
arisen, but also because of the likely pushback from the 
profession towards the courts extending good faith 
obligations in the absence of rule makers doing so out of 
respect for the separation of powers.  The focus of lawyers 
and academics on the specific rules relating to truthfulness 
set out above—rather than good faith—has also taken 
attention away from the possible application of good faith 
obligations to regulating truthfulness.  Despite this, there is 
no reason to believe that such an extension is impossible, or 
undesirable.  
 
1e) Conflicting obligations 
Regulation in Australia and the USA contains other 
obligations which may conflict with those relating to the 
truthfulness of lawyers’ advocacy in mediation.  These are 
supplemented by lawyers’ fiduciary and general law 
duties—such as their general law duty of loyalty towards 
their clients—which may contrast with their obligations 
under relevant regulation. 207  
The primary source of conflict is the duty owed to 
the client.  Solicitors’ Rule 4.1 provides that solicitors’ 
fundamental ethical duty is to act in their clients’ best 
interests while Barristers Rule 37 provides that barristers 
must promote and protect fearlessly the client’s best 
interests by all proper and lawful means.  While cast in 
different and more comprehensive terms, similar obligations 
of lawyers to their clients are evident in Model Rules 1.1–
 
206 See generally Lang, supra note 177. 
207 See, e.g., Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 4.1.1, 10, 11, 12 
(Austl.); Australian Barristers’ Conduct Rules 2015, r. 122–114 (Austl.). 
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1.4.208  The potential for conflict is apparent from the text of 
these rules, especially when clients instruct their lawyers to 
act for them in a manner which is contrary to their legal 
obligations, as occurred in the Mullins case mentioned 
above.209 
Model Rule 1.2 compels lawyers to abide by their 
clients’ decisions concerning the objectives of 
representation.210  If a client’s objective is to mislead or 
withhold critical information from the other party during 
mediation, this Rule would require the lawyer to abide.  An 
obvious clash emerges.  The Comment to Rule 1.2 provides 
guidance by reiterating that lawyers should only use “lawful 
and ethical measures” to serve their clients’ objectives, are 
not “bound to press for every advantage that might be 
realized for a client,” and must “exercise professional 
discretion.”211  Most relevant to truthfulness, it further states 
that Rule 1.2 “does not require the use of offensive tactics” 
– which likely covers the tactic of lying in mediation. 212  
While this Rule is left to professional discretion, the text of 
the Model Rules resolves other conflicts amongst the Rules.  
For example, the obligation of confidentiality in Rule 1.6 is 
expressly stated to trump Rule 4.1(b), through the words 
“unless disclosure is prohibited by 1.6.”213 
In Australia, it is well established that if there is a 
conflict between the duties owed to a client and those owed 
to the administration of justice, the latter prevails.214  In 
other words, the duty to the court (i.e. to the mediator), 
trumps every other conflicting duty (like under Solicitors 
Rule 3.1).  However, outside this type of conflict, there is 
 
208 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.1–1.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
209 [2006] LPT 012. 
210 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
211 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
212 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
213 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
214 Giannarelli v. Wraith (1988) 165 CLR 543, 556–57; Rondel v. Worsley 
(1969) 1 AC 191, 227–28; Solicitors Rule 3.1; Barristers Rule 5. 
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little guidance.  NSW has held that where there is a conflict 
between duties owed to a client and duties owed to a third 
party, those owed to the client prevail.215  Yet, it is unclear 
how extensible this principle is—and to what types of duties 
it applies.  In the USA, the only guidance is in the Preamble 
to the Model Rules, which states that conflicts “must be 
resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional and 
moral judgment guided by the basic principles underlying 
the Rules.”216 
As such, methods for resolving conflicts 
concerning lawyer’s truthfulness obligations remain largely 
unresolved in each jurisdiction.  This is apt to cause 
confusion for some practitioners, allowing them to bend the 
truth during mediation and hide behind the veil of acting in 
the interests of their clients.  While a bright-line rule about 
resolving all types of conflicts between lawyers’ obligations 
may be undesirable (because it would be rigid and difficult 
to apply to all rules and in all factual contexts), it would be 
helpful to provide more explicit guidance about how to 
resolve conflicts between the rules.  For example, Model 
Rule 4.1 and the equivalents in Australia might be amended 
to make it clear that where lawyers perceive their clients’ 
instructions to potentially contravene such rules, they are to 
inform their clients that they cannot act in accordance with 
that instruction because of the operation of the relevant 
rules, and should refuse to act in accordance with that 
instruction despite the client’s insistence.  Attention should 
also be given to expand the grounds for voluntary lawyer 




215 Law Society of New South Wales v. Harvey (1976) 2 NSWLR 154, 170. 
216 AMERICAN BAR, Ethics 2020 Commission Preamble, 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/ 
professional_responsibility/policy/ethics_2000_commission/e2k_preamble/, 
(April 2, 2020).  
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2) HOW THE RULES SHAPE CONDUCT, 
AND HOW THEY CAN BE IMPROVED 
After reading the above, one might ask: If all 
lawyers lie and actively mislead during mediation, then why 
does it matter?  There is a level—albeit potentially 
unethical—playing field.  Norton takes this view, positing 
that so long as deception does not endanger the validity of 
an agreement, then it should be permissible because 
participants can use the process to produce a balance 
between truth and a fair result.217   
This Part argues that the regulation of 
untruthfulness in mediation is important and proposes that 
the rules be clarified to more effectively achieve their 
purposes.   
 
2a) Desirability of clarifying the rules relating to 
truthfulness 
Noting the ambiguity and gaps in the coverage of 
the rules in relation to truthfulness in mediation assessed 
above, the relevant rules in each jurisdiction should be 
amended so that their meaning and the scope of their 
application is clearer.  In the case of Model Rule 4.1, for the 
reasons set out above it is likely that the most desirable 
approach would be to prohibit lies altogether. 
In any case, amendments will not automatically 
change behavior and norms in mediation, as these depend on 
the lawyers involved.  However, amendment is likely to 
incrementally alter conduct, clarify the expectations of 
lawyers in mediation, and at least make lawyers second-
guess whether their conduct accords with the relevant 
rules.218  It will also temper the often-substantial distance 
 
217 Eleanor Holmes Norton, Bargaining and the Ethic of Process, 64 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 493, 532, 545 (1989). 
218 See generally Norton, supra note 217, at 532, 541–551. 
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between common practice and ethical standards in 
negotiation.219   
i) Lies And Puffing
If lawyers are permitted to lie in the manner now
allowed by Model Rule 4.1, then clarity is particularly 
important in relation to the types of facts lawyers may lie 
about during mediation in the USA.  Clarity will also help 
in ascertaining how the good faith obligations apply in both 
Australia and the USA in relation to advocates’ truthfulness 
in mediation.  Clarity in these two areas is likely to reduce 
current debate and uncertainty, and provide lawyers with a 
useful, practical guide of conduct during mediation.220    
Clarification in relation to lying, puffing, and good 
faith may be achieved by providing further examples of what 
type of conduct is acceptable or not under the relevant 
rules—to complement the existing case law and guidance—
which is not helpful for the reasons set out above.  This may 
be achieved by the relevant Australian and U.S. rules 
identifying, akin to the ABA Section for Dispute 
Resolution’s proposal for addressing good faith 
requirements in mediation, “objectively-determinable 
conduct”221 that is permissible and impermissible.  For 
example, in relation to lying, it might be identified that 
where the central issue of a dispute being mediated is the 
value of certain property, then it is impermissible for a 
lawyer to lie about the value of that property. 
Such identification of impermissible, objectively-
determinable conduct will provide participants with a 
clearer understanding of the behavior that can lead to 
219 Norton, supra note 217, at 502–03. 
220 See generally Norton, supra note 217, at 532, 541–551. 
221 Resolution on Good Faith Requirements for Mediators and Mediation 
Advocates in Court-Mandated Mediation Programs, 2004 A.B.A. SEC. DISP. 
RESOL. 2, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
administrative/dispute_resolution/dispute_resolution/draftres2.pdf. 
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sanctions; promote certainty in conduct during mediation; 
and therefore stimulate appropriate conduct by lawyers.222  
This development would be especially desirable because of 
the existence of the discretionary, circumstance-dependent 
tests for determining the status of statements and the lack of 
a definition of “good faith.”223  Clarification in each area 
would provide lawyers with important guidance about what 
is an acceptable statement under the relevant rules, and 
about how to act in “good faith” during mediations.  
In relation to Model Rule 4.1, Peters has also 
suggested its extension to prohibit all false statements about 
“interests and priorities.”224  This would make Model Rule 
4.1 more akin to the Australian rules (which are not limited 
to statements about “material facts”).  The writers take this 
further, suggesting that for reasons explained above, a 
blanket prohibition on lies is appropriate.225 
As Peters explains, such a step is justified in 
circumstances where reported decisions and anecdotal 
evidence suggests that lawyers even lie about material facts 
in mediation (despite the current Model Rule 4.1prohibiting 
this).226  Empirical evidence also supports this change as it 
suggests that lawyers lie about material facts regularly when 
negotiating.227  For example, a survey of a national sample 
of lawyers in the USA found 51% believed that inadequate 
disclosure of material information is a regular problem,228 
and another survey of civil litigators in Illinois, Indiana, and 
 
222 Resolution on Good Faith, supra note 221.  
223 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.1 cmt 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
224 Peters, supra note 61, at 134, 139, and the sources there cited.  
225 Peters, supra note 61, at 139. 
226 Peters, supra note 61, at 124 and the sources there cited.  
227 Art Henshaw & Jess K. Alberts, Doing the Right Thing: An Empirical Study 
of Attorney Negotiation Ethics, 16 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 95, 114 
(2011). 
228 Steven D. Pepe, Standards of Legal Negotiations: Interim Report and 
Preliminary Findings (1983) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with New York 
University Law Review). 
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Michigan found 20% believed that their opposing lawyers 
routinely lied about material facts.229  
ii) Mediation-Specific Rules
In both the USA and Australia, it is desirable to adopt
enforceable rules which are specific to mediation advocacy, 
or to clarify how rules of general application apply to 
mediation.  The various difficulties in relying on rules of 
general application have been identified in the analysis 
above.  Further, the current general rules are drafted for a 
court context in which lawyers are considered partial, 
zealous advocates,230 whereas mediation-specific rules will 
enable more appropriate and specialized regulation of 
conduct in the less adversarial context of mediation.  As 
Wolski posits, it will prevent lawyers in mediation from 
being reduced to amoral gladiators, amoral technicians, and 
hired guns,231 and it will protect the reputation of mediation 
as a collaborative and efficient process for resolving 
disputes.  Further reasons for such clarification of the rules 
will be provided in the analysis below. 
2b) Lawyers’ attitudes and conduct 
iii. Why The Imperfection Of Enforcement 
Warrants Clarification Of The Rules
The enforcement of the relevant rules in Australia 
and the U.S. gives them practical significance and 
establishes their ability to regulate lawyers’ conduct during 
mediation.   
In Australia, both the Solicitors and Barristers 
Rules have significant force.  They are enforceable through 
229 Ibid; Robert B. Gordon, Note, Private Settlement as Alternative 
Adjudication: A Rationale For Negotiation Ethics, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
503, 508 n.29 (1985). 
230 Wolski, supra note 14, at 31. 
231 Wolski, supra note 14, at 31. 
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state statutes.232  For example, in New South Wales, section 
298(b) of the Legal Profession Uniform Law 2014 provides 
that “conduct consisting of a contravention of the Uniform 
Rules” can constitute unsatisfactory professional conduct or 
the more serious professional misconduct.233  In 
circumstances of such a finding, section 302 of that Act also 
empowers the designated disciplinary tribunal to make 
orders including for removal from the professional roll, 
imposing conditions on practicing certificates, and 
suspending or cancelling practicing certificates.234  These 
are serious sanctions that may be imposed for a breach of the 
above rules.  It is also worth noting that the damage to 
reputation caused by an allegation of a breach of the 
Solicitors or Barristers Rules has a significant impact in 
deterring improper conduct in mediation.235  This is also true 
in the U.S. in relation to the Model Rules.236  
In the U.S., there are many methods for enforcing 
compliance with the Model Rules.  Model Rules 8.4 and 8.5 
provide a basis for the relevant disciplinary authority to 
bring an action against a lawyer for misconduct—with broad 
grounds set out in 8.4 for a finding of “professional 
misconduct.”237  This is similar to section 298 of the Legal 
Profession Uniform Law 2014.238  Significant consequences 
arise from a breach of the Model Rules.239  The ABA’s 
Formal Ethics Opinion 06-439 cites numerous cases where 
disciplinary action has been successfully brought against 
lawyers for breaching Model Rule 4.1 resulting in sanctions 
against lawyers such as striking off or suspension, the setting 
 
232 NEW SOUTH WALES BAR ASSOCIATION, Barrister Rules, 
https://nswbar.asn.au/bar-standards/barristers-rules, (last visited Sept. 20, 
2020). 
233 Legal Profession Uniform Law 2014 (N.S.W.) s 298 (Austl.). 
234 Legal Profession Uniform Law 2014 (N.S.W.) s 302 (Austl.). 
235 Lawrence, supra note 176, at 36. 
236 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
237 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
238 Legal Profession Uniform Law 2014 (N.S.W.) s 298 (Austl.). 
239 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS'N 1983). 
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aside of settlement agreements, and civil malpractice 
lawsuits against the lawyers themselves.240  For example, in 
one case, a lawyer was suspended from practice for three 
years for repeated, abusive behavior during mediations.241  
Lawyers have also been subject to costs sanctions for their 
client’s failure to appear at a mediation.242   
Outside the Model Rules, similarly to Australian 
courts, courts in each U.S. state have an inherent power to 
regulate the conduct of admitted lawyers in and out of 
court.243  Actions may also be brought for lawyer 
malpractice and negligence and for breaches of contracts 
between lawyers and clients.244  These are rare in Australia, 
but more common in the U.S. because of the potential for 
punitive damages to be awarded in some U.S. states.245  
U.S. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, 
particularly 16(f), provides another basis for which 
disciplinary action may be brought against a lawyer for their 
conduct during mediation—namely for failing to appear, 
being substantially unprepared to participate, not 
participating in good faith, or failing to obey pretrial 
orders.246  This action may result in personal or costs 
 
240 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 06-439 (2006). 
241 In re Fletcher, 424 F.3d 783, 785, 795 (8th Cir. 2005). 
242 Doorstop Beverages of Longwood, Inc. v. Collier, 928 So. 2d 482, 483 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2006). 
243 SUP. CT. OF THE STATE OF N.Y., APP. DIV., SECOND JUD. DEP’T, Attorney 




(22%20NYCRR%20part%201200). (last visited Sep. 11, 2020).; Ariz. R. Sup. 
Ct. 3.  
244 E.g., Can I Sue My Lawyer for Negligence, Stanfer Stanfield Law, (Jul. 12, 
2020) https://www.stangerlaw.com/blog/sue-lawyer-negligence/. 
245 Metcalfe v. Waters, 970 S.W.2d 448, 449 (Tenn. 1998); Clauson v. 
Kirshenbaum, C.A. No. 92-3410, 1996 R.I. Super. LEXIS 23, at 13-14 (Super. 
Ct. Jan. 19, 1996).  
246  FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f) (2020). 
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sanctions against the relevant lawyer under Rule 16(f), as 
federal courts have used the rule to sanction bad faith in 
mediation.247  28 U.S.C. § 1927 provides an additional basis 
for costs sanctions against a lawyer who commits 
misconduct.248  
The enforceability of the above provisions in both 
Australia and the U.S. ensures that they play a key role in 
deterring improper conduct and incentivizing lawyers to act 
truthfully in mediation.  However, difficulties in enforcing 
the obligations justify the clarification of lawyers’ existing 
obligations.  These difficulties include the nature of 
mediation as a non-public forum, where it is difficult for 
opposing parties and the mediator to discover lies or 
mistruths—as without discovery processes and the 
presentation of objective evidence, the parties are 
susceptible to the information provided to them by the other 
parties, and have no opportunity to test the truthfulness of 
assertions made during mediation.  More than in other 
contexts, rules can therefore be violated with confidence that 
there will be no enforcement nor punishment for 
breaches.249   
This is particularly so in circumstances where no 
agreement is reached at mediation and therefore no reliance 
or loss as well as no transcript or record of the mediation, 
which makes it hard to prove misconduct.  As the Court 
explained in Otto, courts struggle to find breaches of ethical 
rules because there is no record and the parties’ memories 
are often “hazy at best,” so the relevant court or tribunal 
“cannot verify what statements were actually made and what 
documents were presented” during mediations.250  All of the 
above makes clarity of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures 
 
247 Lawrence, supra note 176, at 55; FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f) (2020). 
248 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (LexisNexis, Lexis Advance 2020). 
249 White, supra note 109, at 926. 
250 Otto v. Hearst Commc’ns, No. 17-CV-4712, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35051, 
at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2019). 
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essential to assist enforcement efforts by establishing clear 
expectations and to prevent lawyers hiding behind the 
unlikelihood of enforcement, often bred by ambiguity in the 
rules, to advocate untruthfully in mediation.  
  
iv. Why The Incentive For Lawyers To Lie 
Warrants Clarification Of The Rules 
As humans, lawyers’ behavior is affected by 
innumerable factors.  In the context of mediation, there are 
certain factors which consistently shape lawyers’ conduct 
and advocacy.  Some of these factors provide lawyers with 
an incentive to lie during mediation and, therefore, support 
the clarification of the rules to counter these incentives.   
First, mediation has become increasingly 
adversarial, and the approaches lawyers have employed 
during mediation have become increasingly similar to those 
in court proceedings.251  Relis’ research in the USA revealed 
that lawyers viewed mediation as a tactical, adversarial 
process which could be used strategically to convey certain 
information and confidentially communicate directly with 
the other side.252  Lawyers have therefore been injected with 
a motive to win at all costs, which can often lead to 
sacrificing the truth.253  This is particularly so in the USA, 
where it is submitted there is a starker culture of distrust 
amongst practitioners—so evident that states such as New 
York have adopted Standards of Civility applicable to 
lawyers, which is a development not fathomed in Australia 
 
251 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in ADR Representation: A Roadmap of 
Critical Issues, 4 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 3, 3–4 (1997). 
252 TAMARA RELIS, PERCEPTIONS IN LITIGATION AND MEDIATION: LAWYERS, 
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFFS, AND GENDERED PARTIES 194 (2009). 
253 Donald E. Campbell, Raise Your Hand and Swear to Be Civil: Defining 
Civility as an Obligation of Professional Responsibility, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 99, 
106–07 (2011) (discussing how lawyers will lie in order to “get a leg up over 
opposing counsel.”) 
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largely because it is assumed that lawyers would inherently 
display such civility.254    
 Second, there is often an inequality of resources and 
bargaining power between the parties to a mediation.255  
This inequality may lead the lawyer representing the less 
powerful side to employ tactics, such as lying and active 
misrepresentation, to equalize this inequality.256  This is 
problematic in circumstances where there is ambiguity in the 
applicable rules, because combined with the inequality, it 
provides fuel for a lawyer to lie.257  The same may also be 
said for an inequality in the experience or expertise of 
counsel, because less experienced counsel may flaunt with 
the ambiguity in the relevant rules and tell lies to 
compensate for their inexperience.258  Peters similarly 
explains that lawyers who lie during mediations often 
display lesser skill levels and lack comprehensive 
preparation.259  
 An imbalance of power may also arise in a different 
context—where one party is represented by a lawyer but the 
other is not.260  Such inequality may render telling lies 
particularly influential in the mediation.  A serious question 
emerges about whether the lawyer should be subject to a 
heightened duty of disclosure in such circumstances to 
 
254 Paula Baron & Lillian Corbin, The Unprofessional Professional: Do 
Lawyers Need Rules? (2017). [source needed—based on abstract of article; 
discusses Australia’s lawyer-civility standard]; see also Campbell, supra note 
253, at 106–107.  
255 See Elaine Smith, Danger-Inequality of Resources Present: Can the 
Environmental Mediation Process Provide an Effective Answer, 1996 J. DISP. 
RESOL. 379, 381 (1996). 
256 Campbell, supra note 253, at 106–107. 
257 Campbell, supra note 253, at 106 (2011) (“[T]he stated purpose of civility 
codes is to ‘clarify and to articulate important values held by many members of 
the bench and the bar’ by placing expected standards of civility in one 
document.”). 
258 Relis, supra note 124, at 159.  
259 Peters, supra note 61, at 141. 
260 See generally Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Mediation, Self-Represented Parties, 
and Access to Justice: From There to Here, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 78 (2019). 
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counter the obvious imbalance of power arising from the 
unrepresented party’s likely inability to identify mediation 
tactics, or the nuances of the law.261  The potential for 
unrepresented parties to unwittingly believe and rely on lies, 
or to be actively misled, also puts mediators “in a difficult 
conflict between their obligations to remain impartial and to 
promote a level of informed consent essential to self-
determination.”262  However, in the same sense it might be 
argued that the unrepresented party is also able to freely lie 
or tell mistruths, and often being a non-lawyer, is more 
likely to do so.  So, while this may be an area for future 
reform, it is likely to be subject to debate. 
Third, lawyers’ personalities and the dynamics of 
relationships between lawyers may urge some to push the 
line where there is lenient regulation of truth.263  Lawyers’ 
characters and interactions have “material effects on all 
actors’ mediation experiences and results,” and on truth in 
mediation.264  Related to this, tensions between lawyers’ 
conceptions as representatives of a profession subject to 
specific rules of conduct and as businesspeople seeking the 
best outcome for their client impacts adherence to the rules 
relating to truthfulness.265  The impact of lawyers’ 
relationships on truthfulness is especially prevalent where 
there is distrust engendered through past practice, because 
lawyers are then more likely to lie because they believe the 
other side will do the same to obtain advantage.266  
 
261 Cf. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986); MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT 
r. 4.3 (AM. BAR ASS'N 1983). 
262 Peters, supra note 61, at 132. 
263 See generally Peters, supra note 61, at 141–42. 
264 Relis, supra note 124, at 158. 
265 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Dispute Processing and Conflict Resolution 360 
(2003). 
266 William Wan & Sarah Kaplan, Why Liars Lie: What science tells us about 
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 These factors heighten the importance of clarifying 
the requirements of the rules relating to truth in mediation 
so that lawyers do not take advantage of ambiguity or a lack 
of coverage in the rules for ulterior motives such as those 
above. 
 
2c) The perception of mediation and its utility in 
resolving disputes 
The way truth is regulated during mediation affects 
the integrity and public perception of mediation as a process 
for resolving disputes.267  Loose regulation is likely to lead 
to a race to the bottom for truth and transform mediation into 
an even more adversarial forum in which both sides expect 
the other to lie or misrepresent matters for their gain.  This 
provides an environment in which lawyers may believe they 
have greater opportunity and perhaps even impunity for 
mistruths, leading to the proliferation of falsity in 
mediation.268  This impacts the integrity of the mediation 
process and urges parties to prefer court litigation because it 
is viewed as the only true forum of truth.  It is also likely to 
diminish the collaborative spirit of mediation and one of 
mediation’s primary advantages—to preserve relationships 
between the parties while resolving a dispute.269  
Loosely regulating truth also undermines 
mediation’s potential to explore and reach alternative 
outcomes for the parties beyond the win-lose outcomes of 
adjudication.270  Lies prevent parties from discovering joint 
gains and inhibit mediators’ abilities to explore interests and 
 
science/wp/2018/08/24/why-liars-lie-what-science-tells-us-about-false-
statements/ (referencing a study that found people lie more when others are 
being dishonest). 
267 Wan & Kaplan, supra note 266. 
268 Wan & Kaplan, supra note 266. 
269 The Liberty Group, 8 Benefits of Mediation, The Liberty Group (June 8, 
2017), http://thelibertygroup.com.au/8-benefits-of-mediation/. 
270 See Peters, supra note 61, at 138. 
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help the parties develop complimentary outcomes.271  Lies 
also undesirably assist parties to divide the outcome pie 
favorably in their interest but do not help expand that pie for 
the benefit of all.272  
Additionally, loosely regulating truth will likely 
inhibit the efficiency of mediation as an ADR process.  For 
example, if lying about facts is condoned, it will require 
lawyers to expend resources in checking and verifying all 
factual representations of their opposition.273  It is apt to 
undermine the purposes of the mediation in the court-
context, such as reducing docket congestion, aiding 
effective judicial administration, and promoting productive 
negotiation outside of court.274  Like the Queensland Court 
of Appeal said in Mullins: “[p]robity is essential to the utility 
of mediation as a form of alternative dispute resolution.”275 
At a personal level, lawyers and parties are unlikely 
to take mediation seriously if they know the other side is 
allowed to regularly lie about significant matters because of 
the ambiguity of the applicable rules.276  As is explained in 
the ABA’s Formal Ethics Opinion 06-439, this is especially 
because a neutral mediator is involved, and communication 
deteriorates as mediators loop statements made by the 
parties.277  Further, ambiguity in the rules is likely to deter 
parties from settling a matter at mediation because they 
 
271 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics, Morality, and Professional Responsibility 
in Negotiation, Dispute Resolution Ethics: A Comprehensive Guide 147 
(Phyllis Bernard & Bryant Garth eds., 2002). 
272 Peters, supra note 61, at 139. 
273 See David R. Hague, Fraud on the Court and Abusive Discovery, 16 NEV. 
L. J. 707, 711–12 (2016) (providing examples of attorney trickery during 
discovery). 
274 Keepoutofcourt.com, Benefits of Mediation, Keep Out of Court, 
https://www.keepoutofcourt.com/benefits-of-mediation/. 
275 Legal Services Commissioner v Voll [2008] QCA 293 [67] (Wilson J), [1] 
and [70] (Keane JA and Dutney J agreeing) (Austl.). 
276 Wan & Kaplan, supra note 266.  
277 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 06-439 (2006). 
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suspect that any settlement will be based on mistruths and 
misrepresentations made during mediation.278  Instead, 
parties will likely wait until a court trial where there are 
more comprehensive methods for uncovering the truth.279  
While some commentators argue that deception is 
inherent in all negotiation and that the parties accept the 
loose regulation of truth as intrinsic to mediation,280 for the 
reasons stated above, more comprehensive and clearer 
regulation of truthfulness will likely preserve mediation’s 
long-term legitimacy as a dispute resolution process.  
We can, and should, do better.  Appropriate 
amendments will help ensure mediation consistently 
produces fair and just outcomes and improve the durability 
of agreements reached.  It will also enable mediators to more 
effectively foster joint, interest-based negotiating and use 
privately shared information to create value for the parties, 
ultimately preserving mediation's potential as a viable forum 
for interest-based negotiating.281 
 
CONCLUSION 
The comparative analysis undertaken above shows 
that the Australian rules more comprehensively and strictly 
regulate truth in mediation.  Yet, like their U.S. counterparts, 
there remain gaps and ambiguities within the rules, such as 
in relation to the application of good faith requirements, 
which should be addressed.  
The Australian experience shows that crafting rules 
relating to the truthfulness of lawyers’ advocacy during 
 
278 Robert J. Burns, Jr., Mediation Techniques and Why Honesty Is Always the 
Best Policy, Perry Dampf Dispute Solutions, 5, 
https://www.perrydampf.com/docs/Mediation-Techniques-Honesty-Always-
Best-Policy.pdf. 
279 See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(d)(3) (2020); Hague, supra note 273, 709–10 
(mentioning the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have a process for 
determining fraud on the court). 
280 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 06-439 (2006). 
281 Peters, supra note 61, at 139. 
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mediation is not difficult if lawyers are required always to 
be truthful.  On the other hand, the U.S. experience with 
Model Rule 4.1(a) shows that, if lawyers are allowed to lie 
when negotiating, it is not possible to draft a morally and 
intellectually justifiable rule that draws a bright line between 
permissible and impermissible lying.  This is because, as 
explained above, the drafting exercise is inherently self-
contradictory.  
Model Rule 4.1(a) was a retrograde step in 1983 in 
the regulation of the truthfulness of lawyers.282  In the 
writers’ view, it should be amended to require lawyers 
always to be truthful.  If there is no appetite to amend Model 
Rule 4.1(a), it is suggested that the U.S. will benefit from 
greater clarity in the rules relating to truthfulness in 
mediation, particularly through the changes suggested in 
Part Two of this article.  
The changes advocated in this article will address 
the difficulties in enforcing the rules, counter lawyers’ 
incentives to lie, provide lawyers with practical guidance 
about what is permissible and impermissible behavior 
during mediation, prophylactically deter lawyer misconduct, 
help achieve the fundamental purposes of mediation, and 




282 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.1(a) (AM. BAR ASS'N 1983). 
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